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JUSTICE SCALIA FOR THE DEFENSE? 
Joanmarie Haria Davolit 
[T]he studies the Court cites in no way justify a 
constitutional imperative that prevents legislatures and juries 
from treating exceptional cases in an exceptional way-by 
determining that some murders are not just the acts of 
happy-go-lucky teenagers, but heinous crimes deserving of 
death.' 
In dissenting from the 2005 Roper v. Simmons decision that held 
that imposition of the death penalty on juvenile defendants violates 
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Justice Scalia 
continued to solidify his prosecution-oriented, law-and-order 
reputation. 2 Widely considered to be one of the most politically 
conservative Justices on the United States Supreme Court, many 
believe that his ideology results and rulings are hostile to the rights of 
criminal defendants. 3 Despite Scalia's reputation, the impact of his 
decisions often benefits criminal defendants. 
A large number of scholars have studied Justice Scalia's writings 
and examined his judicial philosophy. 4 Some scholars have focused 
on his background-upbringing, religion, and education-searching 
t Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. B.A., University of 
Virginia, 1985; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1988. The author would 
like to thank Judy A. Clausen, Gina D'Amico, Kassia Fialkoff, Shawn Friend, 
Michael Lewyn, and Todd Petit. 
1. Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 619 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2. See id. at 607-30. 
3. See Joan Bisirupic, Supreme Court: Suspects Must Assert Right to Silence, USA 
TODAY (June 24, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.comlnews/washingtonl 
judicial/201 0-06-0 l-supreme-court-miranda-rights _ N .htm; Linda Greenhouse, In 
Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,2007, at AI, 
available at http://www.nytimes.coml2007/07/01lwashingtonlOIscotus.htm1; Adam 
Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: We Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, 
at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2008/03/25/us/25bar.htm1; Reuters, 
Scalia Says He Sees a Rolefor Physical Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,2008, at 
AI7, available at http://www.nytimes.coml200S/02/I3/usI13scalia.html. 
4. See, e.g., George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1297 (1990). 
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for the origins of his viewpoint. 5 Others have focused on his political 
beliefs and strong conservative attitude. 6 Justice Scalia has self-
described his judicial philosophy as adhering to the "original 
meaning" of the Constitution and has defended his rulings with 
historical evidence. 7 Most scholarship focuses on understanding the 
method he uses to reach certain results. 8 In contrast, this article looks 
at his jurisprudence from a different perspective: not to attempt to 
understand why he reaches a certain result, but to understand what 
impact his decisions have on the rights of criminal defendants. 
Scholarship, legal writings, and popular media describe Justice 
Scalia, to one level or another, as being prosecution oriented. 9 This 
conclusion stems from his conservative political philosophy. As 
several scholars have pointed out, "[i]n Fourth Amendment, Fifth 
Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Death Penalty, 
and Habeas Corpus criminal justice cases, 'Scalia consistently joined 
the other conservative judges as a relatively dependable vote against 
assertions of rights by criminal defendants. '" \0 Particular 
significance is often attached to what is interpreted as Justice Scalia's 
enthusiastic support for the death penalty. II 
In contrast to his pro-prosecution reputation, his rulings often 
positively impact the rights of criminal defendants. 12 Some scholars 
5. See id. at 1298-1300. 
6. Shawn Burton, Comment, Justice Scalia's Methodological Approach to Judicial 
Decision-Making: Political Actor or Strategic Institutionalist?, 34 U. ToL. L. REv. 
575 (2003). 
7. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001) ("(W]e must take the long view, 
from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward."); Antonin Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,1183-85 (1989). 
8. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 6, at 576. 
9. Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging 
Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 593, 598 (1995) ("Among 
the Rehnquist Court [J]ustices, Justices Thomas and Scalia are most hostile to the 
rights of criminal defendants."); James Edward Wyszynski, Jr., Comment, In Praise 
of Judicial Restraint: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 1989 DETROIT C. 
L. REv. 115, 161 (1989) ("From the beginning of his appointment process, 
commentators attempted to paint Justice Scalia as an extremist, a conservative judicial 
activist, who was determined to undo all that the Court had accomplished with its 
social agenda of the last quarter-century."). 
10. Burton, supra note 6, at 585 (quoting DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, 
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTON IN SCALIA 177 (1996)). 
11. Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Justice Scalia's Influence on Criminal 
Justice, 34 U. ToL. L. REv. 535,549 (2003) ("[Justice Scalia's] commitment to capital 
punishment may loom especially large in his decisions and opinions on the subject."). 
12. See infra Part I. 
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have begun to notice 13 and to explain these decisions through an 
understanding of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy.I4 Whether or 
not such decisions compliment his overall judicial philosophy, in 
many unexpected areas, Justice Scalia expresses himself as a strong 
defender of the rights of the accused over the power of the 
government. 
This article examines criminal United States Supreme Court 
decisions written by Justice Scalia: majority opinions, concurring 
opinions, and dissents. Rather than analyzing the impact of Justice 
Scalia's judicial philosophy or legal theory on his decisions, this 
article examines the impact of Justice Scalia's decisions on the rights 
of criminal defendants. Part I describes scholars who have analyzed 
Justice Scalia's judicial theory and found that it has an unexpectedly 
positive impact on criminal defendants. Part II examines all cases in 
which Justice Scalia has written majority, concurring, or dissenting 
opinions that favor the prosecution. Finally, Part III examines the 
cases where Justice Scalia has ruled for the defense and finds that the 
overall impact of Justice Scalia's decisions in a variety of areas has 
been to the benefit of criminal defendants. 
I. JUSTICE SCALIA SURPRISES SCHOLARS 
Prior to his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, 
Justice Scalia served as an appellate judge for the D.C. Circuit, where 
he had a pro-prosecution reputation. I5 Shortly after he became a 
member of the Supreme Court, scholars began to notice that his 
conservative political ideology did not necessarily translate into 
rulings that upheld police power over the rights of the criminal 
defendant. 16 As early as 1990, four years after Justice Scalia's 
appointment, Professor George Kannar posited that Justice Scalia did 
not reach stereotypically conservative decisions and in some cases 
13. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The 
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GED. LJ. 
183 (2005). 
14. See discussion infra Part I. 
15. Kannar, supra note 4, at 1321 ("Though his printed opinions as a circuit judge dealing 
with criminal procedure issues are few, and the measure is a crude one, it is notable 
that every one of his D.C. Circuit opinions dealing with criminal procedure-four 
majority opinions and one dissent-supported the prosecution side."). 
16. See, e.g., id. There are numerous articles and books that examine the foundation, 
history, and definition of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy. This article is limited to 
an analysis of articles describing the impact of his judicial theory to the rights of the 
criminal defendant. 
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even wrote decisions that strongly favored criminal defendants 17: 
"[I]t is the basic constitutional methodology he has adopted-
combining respect for stare decisis with a 'restrained' interpretation 
of precedent and the Constitution's text-which so frequently, and 
automatically, takes him to the defendant's side.,,18 Professor Kannar 
focused on Justice Scalia's Catholic education, demanding 
intellectual upbringing, and the social environment of his childhood, 
and found that the combination of these elements led Justice Scalia to 
embrace the original meaning of the Constitution. 19 
Professor Kannar reviewed cases early in Justice Scalia's tenure on 
the Supreme Court that surprisingly disfavored the prosecution. He 
wrote that, contrary to expectations, Justice Scalia "strongly rejected 
any appeal to a 'law and order' ideology as part of Fourth 
Amendment decision-making,,20 and for double jeopardy analysis. 21 
In an early indication of Justice Scalia's views on the [C]onfrontation 
[C]lause, Professor Kannar noted that "Justice Scalia articulated a 
surprisingly strong and absolute defense of what he saw as basic 
Confrontation Clause principles.,,22 Professor Kannar found that 
these unexpected results stem from Justice Scalia's adherence to his 
judicial technique of original meaning, rather than from any political 
agenda. 23 
Some scholars, while describing Justice Scalia's pro-prosecution 
bias, also recognize that his decisions do not always reflect a 
commitment to conservatism. 24 Others have suggested that his 
judicial philosophy makes him more neutral so that he does not favor 
prosecution over defense or vice versa. 25 Clearly, there is suspicion 
17. See id. 
18. Id. at 1302. 
19. Id. at 1315-17. 
20. Id. at 1327. 
21. Jd. at 1338. Professor Kannar wrote, 
Id. 
Double jeopardy was not about common sense or law 
enforcement policy or keeping bad people in places where they 
could do no harm. As with the Fourth Amendment and the 
[C]onfrontation [C]lause, in the law of double jeopardy, outcome-
related "policy" considerations simply had no role. The Court 
should just learn to live with the unpleasant fact that, every so 
often, adhering to the "rules" does create windfalls. 
22. Jd. at 1330. 
23. Id. at 1331. 
24. Smith & McCall, supra note II, at 548 ("It should be acknowledged that Scalia's 
commitments do not all lead inevitably to conservative policy outcomes."). 
25. See Wyszynski, Jr., supra note 9, at 120, 144-45 (discussing the impact of Justice 
Scalia's use of judicial restraint). 
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that when Justice Scalia rules for the defense, he does so reluctantly 
and against his own personal beliefs. 26 
More recently, Professor Stephanos Bibas noted that Justice 
Scalia's versions of originalism and formalism result in decisions that 
may seem to benefit criminal defendants precisely because the 
Constitution strongly protects such rights. 27 In examining Justice 
Scalia's decisions concerning the Confrontation Clause and the right 
to have juries make findings beyond a reasonable doubt, Professor 
Bibas examined certain cases that show Justice Scalia's idealization 
of the rights embodied in the Constitution to protect the accused may 
likewise benefit some criminal defendants in the modern criminal 
justice system. 28 However, Professor Bibas found that because the 
current criminal justice system has turned so far away from jury 
trials, the reality of Justice Scalia's rulings may give no practical 
benefit to the large majority of criminal defendants who forgo a jury 
trial and plead guilty. 29 
When analyzing the Confrontation Clause,30 Professor Bibas found 
that Justice Scalia's adherence to originalism successfully reinterprets 
the Constitution in a manner that revives the right to cross-examine 
witnesses in a meaningful way: "My point is not that the Clause is 
limited to the particular scenario that the Framers had in mind. 
Rather, that historical scenario illuminates the plain meaning of the 
text (exclusion of out-of-court testimony), which in turn is what 
governs today.,,3l By reversing a long series of cases that permitted 
the admission of hearsay evidence that met a loose reliability 
standard and resulted in conflicting applications, Professor Bibas 
found that Justice Scalia's adherence to originalism allowed him to 
reject decades of mistaken Supreme Court decisions while 
simultaneously relying upon history to revive the Confrontation 
Clause. 32 
However, Professor Bibas argued that since few cases currently are 
resolved through trial, originalism and formalism lack relevance in 
26. Burton, supra note 6, at 602-03 ("That is, Scalia's mechanistic method of 
interpretation necessarily resulted in a ruling at odds with his personal beliefs, 
specifically a distaste for criminal defendants."). 
27. See Bibas, supra note 13, at 192. 
28. See id. at 204. 
29. See id. at 197, 199. 
30. A landmark case concerning the Confrontation Clause, Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), is discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 247-64 and 
accompanying text. 
31. See Bibas, supra note 13, at 191. 
32. See id. at 192. 
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the modem sentencing process. 33 The Constitution not only protects 
the criminal defendant from an oppressive government, but it also 
protects the right of the people to participate in the criminal justice 
system through the jury system.34 As Professor Bibas explained that 
"[ w ]hile we normally speak of separating legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers, juries also playa role in the separation of powers (or 
checks and balances) in criminal procedure. By safeguarding juries 
against judicial encroachment, the Constitution protects juries' power 
to check judges, legislatures, and prosecutors.,,35 This juror right is 
essentially the right of the u.s. citizen to participate directly in 
government and overrule any of the three branches of governmental 
powers being asserted against another citizen: the legislative branch 
(by refusing to convict a defendant because a law as written by the 
legislature is unjust), the executive branch (by refusing to convict a 
defendant because the law as applied by the prosecutor against an 
individual is unjust), and the judicial branch (by refusing to follow 
the judge's instructions if they are unjust). The jury system is the 
daily embodiment of self-government. 
After describing Justice Scalia's exaltation of the power of the jury, 
Professor Bibas asserted that juries have lost the position they once 
held at the time of the Revolutionary War: "The disappearance of 
juries undermines ... [the] idealized eighteenth-century rule in yet 
another way. The eighteenth-century separation of powers is 
anachronistic in twenty-first century criminal procedure-there are 
hardly any juries left to protect.,,36 Because the overwhelming 
majority of cases are resolved through a guilty plea rather than a 
trial,37 Professor Bibas feared that "[b]y stretching originalism and 
formalism beyond their limits, the Court over-reached and created an 
33. See id. at 195-97 (pointing out the impracticality of abolishing the practice of plea 
bargaining given its modem day popularity, despite the fact that originalism may 
suggest its abolition is constitutionally required). 
34. Se.e id. at 195. 
35. Id. at 187. 
36. Id. at 197. 
37. Id. at 196-97. Professor Bibas wrote, 
Id. 
Article III of the Constitution mandates that '[t]he trial of all 
Crimes ... shall be by Jury,' giving citizen-jurors a non-waivable, 
structural check on judicial and prosecutorial overreaching. 
Unlike the Sixth Amendment, Article III is not phrased as a right 
belonging to the accused. It was meant to be a right of We the 
People to administer justice. . .. Yet, today, jury trials resolved 
fewer than four percent of criminal cases. 
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unworkable sentencing mess.,,38 Professor Bibas essentially argued 
that trial rights are important to preserve, when and if a case actually 
reaches trial. 39 However, because so many cases are resolved 
through plea-bargaining, Justice Scalia's exaltation of the jury system 
simply ignores the experience of the modem criminal defendant. 40 
Professor Bibas's dose of reality (that juries do not resolve many 
cases anymore) makes a compelling point: Justice Scalia's opinions 
that seem to favor a criminal defendant may have the opposite 
result. 41 However, dividing cases into trials and guilty pleas does not 
fully reflect a criminal defendant's experience in the criminal justice 
system. Even if ultimately resolved pursuant to a guilty plea, many 
criminal cases involve multiple hearings prior to the guilty plea and 
may include issues that are resolved during pretrial motions. 42 Issues 
impacting sentencing may well be litigated in a large number of cases 
that ultimately result in guilty pleas. Such litigation occurs during 
preliminary hearings, motions to suppress evidence, and other 
preliminary motions practice. 43 Additionally, Justice Scalia's rulings 
concerning the Confrontation Clause likely benefit every single 
defendant whose case involves cross-examination of witnesses during 
any stage of the criminal process, not merely those cases that 
ultimately are resolved by a jury trial. 44 Thus, Professor Bibas's 
analysis of Justice Scalia's reliance upon originalism and formalism 
does not fully illuminate the impact of his decisions on criminal 
defendants. 45 
II. JUSTICE SCALIA FOR THE PROSECUTION 
Decisions involving criminal defendants receive much attention 
from a wide audience that includes scholars, practitioners, and 
media. 46 Justice Scalia's adherence to the original meaning of the 
Constitution sometimes results in holdings that negatively impact the 
accused, but such cases do not appear dependent upon any political 
38. Id. at 199. 
39. See id. 
40. Id. at 197-98. 
41. See id. at 198 (discussing the impact of the Blakely decision on plea bargaining). 
42. See Edward F. Shennan, The Evolution of American Civil Trial Process Towards 
Greater Congruence with Continental Trial Practice, 7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 125, 
138 (1999). 
43. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 10--17.1; FED. R. EVID. 104, 1101. 
44. See Bibas, supra note 13, at 190--91. 
45. See id. at 204. 
46. See supra notes 3, 11, 16. 
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agenda.47 Three main themes emerge from Justice Scalia's decisions 
that negatively impact criminal defendants: practicality, finality, and 
deference to the Constitution's separation of powers. Because the 
themes of practically and finality often overlap in his writings, they 
are discussed together in this article. On the practical side, Justice 
Scalia's decisions often rest on common-sense arguments, indicating 
a suspicion that the rest of the Court exists in a lofty, idealistic world 
far removed from reality.48 His desire for finality expresses his belief 
that criminal cases need to end at some point, and that these cases 
may ultimately result in the defendant serving a long sentence or 
even being executed. 49 He admits that this is the price paid for 
finality. 50 Additionally, Justice Scalia's insistence that the Court 
remain within its constitutionally mandated role as interpreter, and 
not author, of the law necessitates his use of historically based 
arguments to support his decisions. 51 
A. Death Penalty Cases 
Justice Scalia's conservative and prosecution preferences seem 
most pronounced in capital punishment cases. 52 However, a close 
reading of Justice Scalia's rulings does not reveal a strong preference 
for or defense of capital punishment. Instead, Justice Scalia makes 
two broad points: (1) the death penalty was widely practiced at the 
time the Constitution was ratified, thus the original intent of the 
Constitution did not include abolition of capital punishment and (2) 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in this area, instead of an exercise in 
intellectual consistency and adherence to any particular theory of 
Constitutional interpretation, is instead an attempt by the Justices 
opposed to capital punishment to eliminate executions regardless of 
47. See infra Part II.A-B. 
48. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332, 339, 341 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
49. See Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993). Justice Scalia writes for the majority and 
finds that the 180-day time period under Interstate Agreement on Detainers (lAD) for 
bringing Mr. Fex to trial on charges in another state did not commence until the 
request was delivered to the court and the prosecutor of the detainer-issuing 
jurisdiction. Id. at 52. In the Fex decision, Justice Scalia finds that picking a different 
meaning for the word delivered makes no better sense, and while acknowledging that 
unfortunate consequences may result, points out that the result is "no worse than what 
regularly occurred before the lAD was adopted." Id. at 50. 
50. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 635-36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). 
51. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 872-73 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
52. See infra notes 55-58, 66, 82, 110-13 and accompanying text. 
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the fact that the death penalty clearly does not. violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 53 In his analysis, Justice Scalia routinely exposes and 
criticizes the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and novel justifications 
that the majority on the Court relies upon to strike down death 
penalty laws. 54 
Although since overruled, Justice Scalia has consistently asserted 
the right of the government to execute defendants who were juveniles 
at the time of the offense. 55 Justice Scalia dissented from the 
majority's ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma,56 which held that the 
execution of a criminal defendant who was fifteen years old at the 
time of the crime was unconstitutional. Justice Scalia also authored 
the now overruled decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,57 which held that 
the execution of defendants who were sixteen- and seventeen-year-
old juveniles at the time of the offense did not violate the 
Constitution. In so finding, Justice Scalia emphasized that the 
Constitution gives the legislature the power to determine death 
penalty eligibility. 58 
In his dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, Justice Scalia 
reminded the Court of the role of the legislature and the limitations 
placed on judicial authority: 
We have in the past studiously avoided that sort of 
interference in the States' legislative processes, the heart of 
their sovereignty. Placing restraints upon the manner in 
which the States make their laws, in order to give 15-year-
old criminals special protection against capital punishment, 
may well be a good idea, as perhaps is the abolition of 
capital punishment entirely. It is not, however, an idea that 
is ours to impose.59 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia does not endorse capital punishment or 
the execution of juveniles as something that he personally favors; 
rather, he asserts the rights of the individual state legislatures to 
determine whether or not to have a death penalty and to determine 
53. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88-87, 93 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989), overruled in part by Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005). 
54. See infra text accompanying notes 82-91. 
55. See Stanford, 492 U.S. 361. 
56. 487 U.S. 815, 838, 859 (1988). 
57. 492 U.S. at 380. 
58. Id. at 370-72. 
59. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 877. 
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age eligibility. 60 While some of his language may appear to endorse 
executing juveniles, Justice Scalia's dissent results from his view that 
the reasoning that underlies the court decision is flawed. Justice 
Scalia scornfully dismissed the argument that juveniles are too 
immature to understand the severity of murder: "It is ... absurd to 
think that one must be mature enough to drive carefully, to drink 
responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough to 
understand that murdering another human being is profoundly 
wrong .... ,,61 
In both Thompson and Stanford, Justice Scalia emphasized that 
since the "evolving standards of decency" is one consideration in 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the best standard for what society 
currently believes is decent is to examine the laws that are passed and 
enforced. 
The audience for these arguments, in other words, is not this 
Court but the citizenry of the United States. It is they, not 
we, who must be persuaded. For as we stated earlier, our 
job is to identify the "evolving standards of decency"; to 
determine, not what they should be but what they are. We 
have no power under the Eighth Amendment to substitute 
our belief in the scientific evidence for the society's 
apparent skepticism. 62 
Even these controversial and overruled pro-death-penalty writings of 
Justice Scalia involving juveniles do not reveal that he personally 
endorses the death penalty. Instead, what he endorses is the 
constitutional idealism of self-government. He consistently objects 
to any claims that judges know better than the citizenry. 63 Justice 
Scalia believes that to override laws written by duly elected 
representatives of the people and to replace them with judicial beliefs 
60. Id. In fact, Justice Scalia himself has asserted that he has no preference for a death 
penalty: 
I take no position on the desirability of the death penalty, except 
to say that its value is eminently debatable and the subject of 
deeply, indeed passionately, held views-which means, to me, 
that it is preeminently not a matter to be resolved here. And 
especially not when it is explicitly permitted by the Constitution. 
Baze v. Rees 553 U.S. 35, 93 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
61. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374. 
62. Id. at 378. 
63. Id. at 377-79. 
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"is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-
kings.,,64 
Justice Scalia's majority opinions often involve technical 
procedural issues. Writing for the majority in Sattazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, Justice Scalia found that neither the Double Jeopardy 
nor Due Process Clauses bar the jury from considering a death 
sentence on a retrial where a defendant appealed his conviction and 
sentence of life imprisonment imposed by default because a jury 
failed to agree on the sentence. 65 In refusing to extend the Supreme 
Court's earlier ruling that defendants cannot be resentenced to death 
after they were previously sentenced for life imprisonment,66 Justice 
Scalia adhered to his belief that jury decisions must be deferred to--
but only after a jury has made a fmding beyond a reasonable doubt. 
And because the life sentence in Sattazahn was imposed by default 
after the jury failed to reach a sentence and the defendant appealed 
the conviction seeking a new trial, the prosecutor was free to seek the 
death penalty again at the retrial. 67 In the Sattazhan decision, Justice 
Scalia expressed no preference whatsoever for or against the death 
penalty, but merely limited his analysis to the relevant legal 
principles. 
Justice Scalia has dissented in death penalty cases involving issues 
of jury qualification, eligibility for the death penalty, and various jury 
instruction cases. 68 In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the death 
64. [d. at 379. 
65. 537 U.S. 101, 116 (2003). 
66. [d. at 10(H)9. "Since, we concluded, a sentence of life imprisonment signifies that 
"'the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose 
the death sentence,'" the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a State from seeking the death 
penalty on retrial." [d. at 106 (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 
(1981)). 
67. See generally id. (rejecting the argument that double jeopardy was triggered by the 
prosecution seeking death on retrial after a default sentence of life imprisonment had 
already been imposed). 
68. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-30 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(eligibility for death penalty); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178-85 
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) Gury instructions); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 
739-52 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) Gury qualifications). Although not a death 
penalty case, Justice Scalia also dissented in a case designed to streamline and reduce 
death penalty appeals. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 254-65 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In Hahn, the majority held that the Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction to review a denial of application for certificate of appealability under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDP A). [d. at 253 
(majority opinion). Justice Scalia's dissent argued that there was no right to appeal. 
See id. at 264 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of AEDP A is not obscure. It was 
698 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
penalty did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in 
Gregg v. Georgia,69 which ushered in the modem death penalty era in 
the United States. Gregg upheld a statutory scheme requiring 
bifurcation in capital punishment trials: first, a hearing to determine 
whether or not the defendant is guilty,70 followed by a separate 
hearing to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to 
death or life imprisonment. 71 The Court approved the process where 
the jury makes an individualized decision based on aggravating and 
mitigating factors in deciding whether a death sentence is appropriate 
for a defendant at the sentencing phase. 72 Additionally, the statutory 
scheme at issue offered an appeal to the highest court in the state to 
ensure that the death penalty is proportionate in each case based on 
the crime itself and the individual characteristics of the defendant. 73 
One area in which Justice Scalia disagrees with the current 
jurisprudence is the jury selection process in capital punishment 
cases. 74 Potential jurors in capital murder cases typically undergo 
more extensive voir dire than jurors in noncapital cases. 75 For 
example, jurors are questioned about their opinion on the death 
penalty and their ability to consider the option of a death sentence if 
the defendant is convicted of capital murder. Known as the 
Witherspoon 76 qualification or death qualification,77 the Supreme 
Court suggested in 1968 that any potential juror who would never 
impose the death penalty in any circumstance must be removed from 
the jury for cause. 78 The juror must be removed because, in telling 
to eliminate the interminable delays in the execution of state and federal criminal ... 
justice system[s] produced by various aspects of this Court's habeas corpus 
jurisprudence."). 
69. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
70. Id. at 163. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 193-95 ("[S]uch standards ... provide guidance to the sentencing authority and 
thereby reduce the likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly can be called 
capricious or arbitrary."). 
73. Id. at 198. 
74. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739-52 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that jurors should not be disqualified simply because they would always impose the 
death penalty for capital murder). 
75. Marcia J. Wilson, The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979 
Through December 2007: An Empirical Analysis, 38 N.M. L. REv. 255,263 (2008). 
76. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
77. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 708 n.5 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("death-
qualification"). 
78. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 & n.21. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, 
stated, 
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the court that he or she could never even consider imposing a death 
sentence, the juror admits that he cannot follow the jury instructions 
that require the juror to consider a death sentence. 79 
Defendants responded with two arguments to counter death 
qualification. First, the juror's right to serve on a jury was unfairly 
limited as a result of this ruling.80 Secondly, because all individuals 
who oppose the death penalty must be removed from the jury, then in 
the interest of fairness, all jurors who would vote for death in every 
case regardless of the facts should also be removed for cause during 
death qualification. 81 While the Court has yet to rule on the issue of a 
juror's constitutional right to serve on a capital punishment case 
despite opposing the death penalty, the Court did rule on the issue of 
jurors who would automatically impose death. 
In Morgan v. Illinois, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's 
ruling that the Due Process Clause requires the disqualification of any 
juror who would automatically impose a sentence of death in a 
capital murder tria1. 82 In his critique of the majority's holding, he 
argued that in order to reach its conclusions the Court must misread 
precedent, ignore contradictions within its own reasoning, and take "a 
great leap over an unbridgeable chasm of logic.,,83 He first 
[N]othing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute 
a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only 
veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who 
made unmistakably clear (I) that they would automatically vote 
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any 
evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before 
them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would 
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the 
defendant's guilt. 
Id. at 523 n.21. While Witherspoon did not explicitly require removal of a juror for 
cause for refusing to impose the death penalty, "it is clear from ... the progeny of 
Witherspoon that a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless 
of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause." 
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728. 
79. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 
38,45 (1980)) ("[T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may 
be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. . . . is 
whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. '''). 
80. See, e.g., Adam M. Clark, An Investigation of Death Qualification as a Violation of 
the Rights of Jurors, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. LJ. I (2005). 
81. See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 84 (1988); Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387,414, 
583 A.2d 218,231 (1990); People v. Coleman, 759 P.2d 1260, 1269 (Cal. 1988). 
82. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (Scalia, 1., dissenting). 
83. Id. at 740, 749-50. 
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emphasized the Court's contradictory prior cases, which 
simultaneously hold that the "Sixth Amendment (which is binding on 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) does not require a jury 
trial at the sentencing phase of a capital case,,,84 yet "[i]n a separate 
line of cases . . . we have said that the exclusion of persons who 
merely 'express serious reservations about capital punishment' from 
sentencing juries violates the right to an 'impartial jury' under the 
Sixth Amendment.,,85 Thus, Justice Scalia further demonstrated the 
circular reasoning of the majority that admittedly does not rely upon 
the Sixth Amendment but instead finds that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "any sentencing jury be 
'impartial' to the same extent that the Sixth Amendment requires a 
jury at the guilt phase to be impartial.,,86 Although not a Sixth 
Amendment ruling, the Court must rely upon cases interpreting the 
Sixth Amendment in order to reach its conclusions. 87 
After emphasizing the Court's flawed reasoning, Justice Scalia then 
rejected the Court's conclusion that the Morgan holding is merely a 
logical extension of Witherspoon: 
Witherspoon and succeeding cases held that the State was 
not constitutionally prevented from excluding jurors who 
would on no facts impose death; from which the Court today 
concludes that a State is constitutionally compelled to 
exclude jurors who would, on the facts establishing the 
particular aggravated murder, invariably impose death. 88 
In Illinois, if aggravating factors are proven during the sentencing 
phase of a death penalty case, a juror may vote for a death sentence 
even if mitigating factors are also proven: "The people of Illinois 
have decided... that murder with certain aggravators will be 
punished by death, unless the jury chooses to extend mercy.,,89 
Justice Scalia explained that even if a juror asserts during voir dire 
that he would always impose a death sentence if aggravating factors 
are proven, such an assertion does not violate Illinois law because the 
84. Id. at 740; see Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1990); Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376,385 (1986); 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). 
85. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 740 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,518 (1968)). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 727-28. 
88. Id. at 749. 
89. Id. at 751. 
2011] Justice Scalia for the Defense? 701 
law allows the juror to so decide. 90 Justice Scalia thus distinguished 
between the Witherspoon-disqualified juror, who would never follow 
the law,91 and the Morgan-disqualified juror who is in fact acting in 
accordance with the death penalty process in Illinois. 
Another area of litigation in death penalty cases concerns whether 
or not defendants have the right to a jury instruction that informs 
jurors of the parameters of a life sentence. 92 Because jurors may 
incorrectly believe that a life sentence allows for parole after a term 
of years,93 defendants subjected to a possible death sentence argued 
that when the alternative to death is a sentence of life without parole, 
due process requires that jurors should be given a jury instruction 
with that information. 94 In Simmons v. South Carolina, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the defendant and held that South Carolina "may 
not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments 
regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while, at the same 
time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant will never 
be released on parole.,,95 Basically a "truth in sentencing" result, the 
Simmons case ensured that jurors who consider imposing a life 
sentence will realize that the defendant will, in fact, spend the rest of 
his or her life in prison. 96 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the majority's rule seemed 
reasonable yet dissented because he believes that the Constitution 
does not require that jurors be given a definition of a life sentence. 97 
Justice Scalia found that the Due Process Clause neither mandates the 
jury instruction nor was there evidence in the record demonstrating 
that the defendant was sentenced to death because the jury feared 
releasing Simmons on parole. 98 Instead, Justice Scalia found that in 
requesting a death sentence the prosecutor relied on "the brutal 
murder of a 79-year-old woman in her home, and three prior crimes 
confessed to by petitioner, all rapes and beatings of elderly women, 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 750-51. 
92. See Kristie Ellison Shufelt, Recent Development, Kelly v. South Carolina: When 
Parole Eligibility is a Matter of Life and Death, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1333, 1333-34 
(2003); C. Lindsey Morrill, Note, Informing Capital Juries About Parole: The Effect 
on Life or Death Decisions, 90 Ky. LJ. 465, 466-67 (2002). 
93. William W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect 
on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1624 (1989). 
94. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160-61 (1994). 
95. Id. at 171. 
96. See id. 
97. Id. at 184-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 180-81. 
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one of them his grandmother," and he was sure that the "sheer 
depravity of those crimes, rather than any specific fear for the 
future,,99 that resulted in the death sentence. In part, Justice Scalia 
found that the majority's reasoning in Simmons is grounded in a 
misunderstanding of the evidence considered by the jury and their 
unsupported assumptions. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia warned that because many other states do not 
offer life without parole, forcing the jury instruction in South 
Carolina might adversely harm a defendant elsewhere. 100 Justice 
Scalia warned that prosecutors could then argue the possibility of 
parole to jurors as another reason to impose the death penalty. 101 
Coming from a Justice with a law-and-order reputation, this is an 
uncharacteristically pro-defense, strategic perspective. 
Justice Scalia consistently objects to the Supreme Court using the 
Due Process Clause to develop special rules for death penalty 
criminal procedure. In Shafer v. South Carolina,102 Justice Scalia 
dissented from the majority's expansion of the Simmons rule.103 In 
Shafer, the defense attorney and the prosecutor disagreed over 
whether or not the issue of future dangerousness had been presented 
to the jury. 104 The Court held that a jury instruction that defined life 
as life without the possibility of parole must be given whenever 
future dangerousness is at issue. 105 Justice Scalia again voiced his 
concern that the majority was improvising rules for capital murder 
without constitutional authority 106: "Providing such information may 
well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help 
the defendant's case)--and many States have indeed required it. The 
Constitution, however, does not.,,107 Essentially, Justice Scalia found 
no constitutional power to develop special criminal procedure rules 
applicable to death penalty cases 108 and warned that such rules may 
ultimately harm criminal defendants. 109 
99. Id. at 181. 
100. /d. at 183 ("Preventing the defense from introducing evidence regarding parolabilty is 
only half of the rule that prevents the prosecution from introducing it as well. If the 
rule is changed for defendants, many will think that evenhandedness demands a 
change for prosecutors as well."). 
101. Id. at 183-84. 
102. 532 U.S. 36 (2001). 
103. Id. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 54. 
105. Id. at 51. 
106. Id. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. (citations omitted). 
108. Id.; accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-38 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Justice Scalia wrote, 
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Justice Scalia's insistence that the Court limit itself to the power 
described in the Constitution is highlighted in recent cases 
concerning eligibility for the death penalty.11O In Atkins v. Virginia, 
the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prevents the 
execution of individuals with mental retardation. III Similarly in 
Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that execution of criminal 
defendants who were juveniles at the time of their offense violates 
the Constitution. 112 In both cases, Justice Scalia wrote scathing 
dissents. 113 
In Atkins and Roper, Justice Scalia found unpersuasive the Court's 
willingness to consider laws of other countries in applying the 
Id. 
Today's decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-
is-different jurisprudence. Not only does it, like all of that 
jurisprudence, find no support in the text or history of the Eighth 
Amendment; it does not even have support in current social 
attitudes regarding the conditions that render an otherwise just 
death penalty inappropriate. Seldom has an opinion of this Court 
rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its 
members. 
109. Shafer, 532 U.S. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). Justice Scalia joined Justice 
Alito in his dissent and argued the following: 
The Court today holds that the Eighth Amendment categorically 
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of 
raping a child. This is so, according to the Court, no matter how 
young the child, no matter how many times the child is raped, no 
matter how many children the perpetrator rapes, no matter how 
sadistic the crime, no matter how much physical or psychological 
trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator's 
prior criminal record may be. The Court provides two reasons for 
this sweeping conclusion: First, the Court claims to have 
identified "a national consensus" that the death penalty is never 
acceptable for the rape of a child; second, the Court concludes, 
based on its "independent judgment," that imposing the death 
penalty for child rape is inconsistent with '''the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" 
Because neither of these justifications is sound, I respectfully 
dissent. 
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
111. 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002). 
112. 543 U.S. 551,578-79 (2005). 
113. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337-53 (Scalia, 1., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-30 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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"evolving standards of decency" aspect of the Eighth Amendment l14 : 
"But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 
'national consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a 
footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious 
organizations, members of the so-called 'world community,' and 
respondents to opinion polls.,,115 In Roper, Justice Scalia again 
objected to the Court's consultation of laws of other nations when 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution116: "Though the views of our own 
citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the 
views of other countries and the so-called international community 
take center stage." 117 
Justice Scalia commented on the naivete of relying upon the claims 
of other countries concerning their criminal justice systems, stating 
that "the Court is quite willing to believe that every foreign nation-
of whatever tyrannical political makeup and with however 
subservient or incompetent a court system-in fact adheres to a rule 
of no death penalty for offenders under 18."118 Similarly, Justice 
Scalia noted that many protections for criminal defendants are 
uniquely American rightS. 119 Thus, the majority should be more 
suspicious of the laws of other countries that may not be enforced in 
those countries and may also be less favorable to the rights of 
114. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 346-48 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant are the 
practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not 
always those of our people."); Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("More 
fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the Court's argument-that American 
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of 
hand."). 
115. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
116. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622. 
117. ld. 
118. Jd. at 623. 
119. Jd. at 624. Justice Scalia wrote, 
ld. 
[T]he basic premise of the Court's argument-that American law 
should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be 
rejected out of hand. In fact the Court itself does not believe it. 
In many significant respects the laws of most other countries 
differ from our law-including not only such explicit provisions 
of our Constitution as the right to jury trial and grand jury 
indictment, but even many interpretations of the Constitution 
prescribed by this Court itself. The Court-pronounced 
exclusionary rule, for example, is distinctively American. 
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criminal defendants 120 than the rights found in the United States 
Constitution. 121 
Once again, Justice Scalia did not express a personal opinion 
supporting capital punishment. In fact, Justice Scalia appeared 
perhaps even neutral on the topic itself: "There is something to be 
said for popular abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing to be 
said for its incremental abolition by this Court.,,122 Rather, Justice 
Scalia objected to the Supreme Court replacing the opinion of the 
citizens, as expressed through laws passed by popularly elected state 
legislators, with the Supreme Court's own opinion. 123 Additionally, 
Justice Scalia expressed his irritation that those opposed to the death 
penalty are attempting to bring about its abolition, not by legislation, 
but by making its imposition unlikely: "The heavily outnumbered 
opponents of capital punishment have successfully opened yet 
another front in their guerilla war to make this unquestionably 
constitutional sentence a practical impossibility.,,124 In referencing 
the "heavily outnumbered opponents of capital punishment," Justice 
Scalia underlined his belief in the political system, where the popular 
vote of elected officials results in the passage of laws voicing the will 
of the people. 125 Thus, much of Justice Scalia's reputation for 
120. Justice Scalia further notes other areas oflaw in which the United States is completely 
at odds with those of most other countries: 
The Court has been oblivious to the views of other countries when 
deciding how to interpret our Constitution's requirement that 
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion' . . .. And let us not forget the Court's abortion 
jurisprudence, which makes us one of only six countries that 
allow abortion on demand until the point of viability. 
ld. at 625 (citation omitted). 
121. Jd. at 626-27. 
122. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,353 (2002). 
123. Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-08. Justice Scalia wrote, 
In urging approval of a constitution that gave life-tenured judges 
the power to nullify laws enacted by the people's representatives, 
Alexander Hamilton assured the citizens of New York that there 
was little risk in this, since "[t]he judiciary ... ha[s] neither 
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment." . .. What a mockery 
today's opinion makes of Hamilton's expectation, announcing the 
Court's conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has 
changed over the past 15 years-not, mind you, that this Court's 
decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has 
changed. 
ld. (citation omitted). 
124. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994). 
125. See id. at 178-80, 184-85. 
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supporting the death penalty stems from what is presumed to be his 
preference because of the results he reaches. However, his support is 
not for the death penalty, but for the rights of the people to choose 
their own laws. 
While Justice Scalia routinely asserts the constitutional right of 
individual states to retain the death penalty as a potential punishment 
within the criminal justice system, his impact is minimized by the 
small percentage of death penalty cases. The overall impact of 
Supreme Court death penalty decisions is actually quite narrow, and 
often limited to other capital murder cases. 126 For example, in the 
majority of murder cases, defendants are not eligible for the death 
penalty; 127 they simply have not committed a crime that is punishable 
by death under the relevant state or federal statute. 128 Thus, because 
murder is only a small percentage of all crime, and because very few 
of those murders qualify as a possible death penalty case, then the 
total impact of Justice Scalia's impact on criminal defendants is by 
definition much narrower. 
There are significant differences in death penalty cases that make 
Justice Scalia's impact on death penalty jurisprudence seem wider 
than it actually is. First, the majority of death penalty cases go to 
trial-a much higher percentage than overall felony cases, where the 
vast majority result in guilty pleas due to plea bargaining. 129 Thus, a 
126. See Eric Tennen, The Supreme Court's Influence on the Death Penalty in America: A 
Hollow Hope?, 14 B.u. PUBL. INT. L.J. 251, 257-67 (2005) (discussing specific death 
penalty cases). Of course, the author realizes that saying a Justice rules for the 
defendant in many areas, except capital punishment, is a little like saying, "[0 ]utside 
of the killings, [Washington, D.C.] has one of the lowest crime rates in the country." 
Judi Hasson, Mayor: D.C. Crime Rates Low, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 1989, at A2. 
Nonetheless, as discussed infra, there are many reasons to distinguish between capital 
punishment and all other crimes in this assessment. 
127. See Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, The Death Penalty, and Ordinary 
Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REv. 719, 724 
(2007); see also Frank Green and Reed Williams, Many Factors Figure in Death-
Penalty Cases, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 3,2010, at Local News, available at 
http://www2.timesdispatch.com!news/2010/oct/03/exec03-ar-538839/ (suggesting 
roughly one third of murder cases are eligible for the death penalty). 
128. TRAcy L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2008-STATISTICAL 
TABLES tbl. 1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ pdf/cp08st.pdf 
(listing crimes punishable by death, by state). 
129. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 -
STATISTICAL TABLES 24 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. "But only some of those tests are implicated in 
prosecutions, and only a small fraction of those cases actually proceed to trial. ... 
([N]early 95% of convictions in state and federal courts are obtained via guilty plea)." 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) (citation omitted). 
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competent defense attorney who represents clients accused of a 
capital crime must read multiple cases in which Justice Scalia favored 
the prosecution's argument over the defendant subject to the death 
penalty. Certainly many of these death penalty decisions have impact 
beyond death penalty cases; 130 even defense attorneys who never 
represent a defendant charged with capital murder will be familiar 
with such decisions. 
Additionally, Justice Scalia's reasoning in juvenile death penalty 
cases has been overturned, and he primarily writes dissents in many 
other death penalty cases. 131 Even ifhis decisions stem from personal 
animosity toward criminal defendants or personal support of the 
death penalty, such decisions lack widespread impact. 
B. General Criminal Cases 
Justice Scalia has ruled for the government and against the 
defendant in cases concerning issues of criminal procedure and the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 132 
1. Criminal Procedure 
Justice Scalia's decisions in criminal procedure consistently apply a 
strict construction approach to statutory interpretation,133 adhere to 
the plain meaning of the words used by the drafters of the statutes, 
and enforce procedural rules and deadlines. 134 Such an approach 
sometimes benefits the prosecution and sometimes the defense, 
depending on whether the rule of lenityl35 applies. In Deal v. United 
States, the Court did not apply the rule oflenity because there was no 
130. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978) (holding that jurors who clearly 
manifest that they cannot "abide by existing law" may be properly excluded from the 
jury). 
131. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005); see also, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-54 (2002) (Scalia, 1., dissenting). 
132. See discussion infra Part Il.B.l-3. 
133. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293-97 (2008) (upholding the 
PROTECT Act as not overly broad under the Fifth Amendment and as complying 
with the Due Process Clause using a strict approach to statutory construction). 
134. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 186-87 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(refusing to reach the merits of the case because it was not a "final decision" and thus 
not properly before the Court). 
135. Rule of lenity is defined as "[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing 
an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, 
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1449 (9th ed. 2009). 
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ambiguity in the statute and thus allowed an enhanced sentence to 
stand. 136 
Particularly in cases involving procedural default, Justice Scalia's 
decisions seem to ruthlessly apply rules without consideration for 
mercy. 137 One example is Puckett v. United States, where Justice 
Scalia wrote for the majority in holding that a procedurally defaulted 
claim for violation of a plea bargain is subject to plain-error 
review. 138 While the Government conceded the violation on appeal, 
Justice Scalia noted that during the sentencing, Puckett's attorney 
never objected that "the Government was violating its obligations 
under the plea agreement by backing away from its request for the 
reduction .... And he did not move to withdraw Puckett's plea on 
grounds that the Government had broken its sentencing promises." 139 
Although Justice Scalia recognized the severity of the Government's 
behavior, he expressed vindication in the ultimate result: 
It is true enough that when the Government reneges on a 
plea deal, the integrity of the system may be called into 
question, but there may well be countervailing factors in 
particular cases. Puckett is again a good example: Given 
that he obviously did not cease his life of crime, receipt of a 
sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility would 
have been so ludicrous as itself to compromise the public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. 140 
Justice Scalia strictly applied procedural default to produce this 
result. 141 Yet Justice Scalia appeared unconcerned with the 
unfairness of the government's plea agreement violation because of 
his view that the defendant was ultimately to blame; the combination 
of the defendant's failure to object with his continued criminal 
136. 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993) (holding that "conviction" within the meaning of the 
statute refers to a finding of guilt by a judge or jury that precedes the entry of a final 
'Judgment of conviction" and the statute does not require that a previous sentence 
become final in order for an enhanced sentence to be imposed for the instant offense). 
137. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421, 430 (1996) (holding that the 
defendant's failure to make a timely motion under Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure created a procedural default, and thus the Court had no authority to 
grant a judgment of acquittal, despite the defendant's claim of actual innocence). 
138. 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009). 
139. ld. at 1427. 
140. Jd. at 1433. 
141. /d. at 1428. 
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behavior after the guilty plea was entered but before he was 
sentenced. 142 
Justice Scalia's interest in the process aspect of criminal procedure 
leads him to prefer a system that promotes finality. In dissenting 
from the majority in one case on the issue of appeal from a guilty 
plea despite procedural default when there is a claim of actual 
innocence, Justice Scalia acknowledged the emotional appeal of 
being sure that only the guilty are convicted, even as he underlined 
that impossibility: 
It would be marvelously inspiring to be able to boast that 
we have a criminal-justice system in which a claim of 
'actual innocence' will always be heard, no matter how late 
it is brought forward, and no matter how much the failure to 
bring it forward at the proper time is the defendant's own 
fault. But of course we do not have such a system, and no 
society unwilling to devote unlimited resources to repetitive 
criminal litigation ever could. 143 
Here, his focus on a reliable, workable, and final process led him to 
reject the defendant's claim. 
Justice Scalia's preferences for stare decisis and adhering to the 
plain meaning of the Constitution prompted him to dissent in Yeager 
v. United States, a case involving the Double Jeopardy Clause. 144 
The majority found that the jury's acquittal of the defendant on some 
counts and inability to reach a verdict on others precludes retrial of 
the hung counts. 145 In dissent, Justice Scalia stated, 
Until today, this Court has consistently held that retrial 
after a jury has been unable to reach a verdict is part of the 
original prosecution and that there can be no second 
jeopardy where there has been no second prosecution. 
Because I believe holding that line ... is more consistent 
with the Court's cases and with the original meaning of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, I would affmn the judgment. 146 
142. Id. at 1431, 1433. 
143. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 635 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
144. 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009). 
145. Id. at 2362-63. 
146. Id. at 2374 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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While Justice Scalia indicated a preference that the Court return to 
the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause,147 at a minimum 
he objects to the expanded doctrine announced by Yeager. 148 
2. Fourth Amendment 
Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment rulings have received particular 
notice for their harsh impact on the rights of criminal defendants. 149 
Although he does not consistently rule against criminal defendants, 150 
decisions involving what constitutes probable cause and prescribing 
the parameters of a search likely have wide impact. 151 Regardless of 
the impact, much of Justice Scalia's pro-prosecution reputation 
results from his ruling against the rights of the defendant in cases 
involving search and seizure. 152 
In 2006, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in two Fourth 
Amendment cases. In United States v. Grubbs, 153 Justice Scalia 
wrote that anticipatory search warrants comply with the Constitution 
as long as two conditions are met: "It must be true not only that if the 
triggering condition occurs 'there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,' . . . but 
also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition 
will occur.,,154 Anticipatory search warrants are signed by a 
magistrate but can only be executed when and if the triggering 
condition occurS. 155 The Court found such warrants valid and, 
moreover, found that the triggering condition does not need to be 
specified in the warrant itself.156 As Justice Scalia wrote, the Fourth 
Amendment "specifies only two matters that must be 'particularly 
147. Id. at 2371 ("This case would be easy indeed if our cases had adhered to the Clause's 
original meaning."). 
148. Justice Scalia expands on this point in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, which upheld retrial 
in a capital murder case. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
149. See Gerald F. Uelman, Knock and Announce Violations After Hudson v. Michigan, 
CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2006, at 62 ("Courts should be reminded of these tragedies 
before they buy into Justice Scalia's characterization of the knock and announce 
requirement as 'the right not to be intruded upon in one's night clothes. "'). 
150. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
151. See Jodi Levine Avergun, Note, The Impact o/Illinois v. Gates: The States Consider 
the Totality o/the Circumstance Test, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 1127, 1127-30 (1987). 
152. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
153. 547 U.S. 90 (2006). 
154. Jd. at 96-97 (citation omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983». 
155. Jd. 
156. Id. at 99. 
2011] Justice Scalia for the Defense? 711 
describ[ed]' in the warrant: 'the place to be searched' and 'the 
persons or things to be seized. ",157 
In Hudson v. Michigan,158 Justice Scalia wrote the decision and 
held that there is no remedy for knock-and-announce violations. In 
Hudson, the officers only waited mere seconds before forcing their 
way into a home to execute a search warrant. 159 Even though the 
Court found that the knock-and-announce rule was violated, it also 
found that the application of the exclusionary rule was not a remedy 
for such a violation. 160 Noting the privacy and dignity issues that the 
knock-and-announce rule was designed to protect, Justice Scalia 
nonetheless recognized that the warrant was going to be served 
however the police decided to enter: "What the knock-and-announce 
rule has never protected, however, is one's interest in preventing the 
government from seeing or taking evidence described in a 
warrant." 161 Thus, because the government had a warrant to search 
and seize, and because exigent circumstances would have suspended 
the knock-and-announce rule anyway, the Court declined to extend 
the exclusionary rule under these circumstances. 162 
In Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues, Justice Scalia has 
dissented in cases upholding a defendant's rights. In Ornelas v. 
United States, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's holding 
that the court of appeals should have reviewed de novo the district 
court's determination of probable cause to search. 163 Justice Scalia 
found the de novo review to have practical difficulties that would 
impose a heavy burden on the courts of appeals and would have 
instead relied upon the trial court's discretion as the appropriate 
standard of review. 164 Reviewing cases for abuse of discretion 
promotes Justice Scalia's interest in finality of judgments because 
such a standard is likely to prevent or limit appellate review in many 
cases. 
157. [d. at 97 (alteration in original). 
158. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
159. [d. at 588. 
160. [d. at 594. 
161. [d. 
162. "But ignoring knock-and-announce can realistically be expected 
to achieve absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of 
evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of 
the premises---dangers which, if there is even 'reasonable suspicion' of 
their existence, suspend the knock-and-announce requirement anyway." 
!d. at 596, 599. 
163. 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
164. [d. at 700-05. 
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In Georgia v. Randolph, Justice Scalia dissented from the 
majority's holding that a warrantless search was unreasonable as to 
the husband who was physically present at his home at the time of the 
search and actively refused to consent even though his wife 
consented to a search. 165 After criticizing the majority's opinion for 
lacking historical integrity, Justice Scalia interjected reality into the 
issue and made an argument more in line with contemporary feminist 
theory166 than one might expect from a conservative judge: 
Given the usual patterns of domestic violence, how often 
can police be expected to encounter the situation in which a 
man urges them to enter the home while a woman 
simultaneously demands that they stay out? The most 
common practical effect of today's decision, insofar as the 
contest between the sexes is concerned, is to give men the 
power to stop women from allowing police into their 
homes-which is, curiously enough, precisely the power 
that Justice Stevens disapprovingly presumes men had in 
1791. 167 
Justice Scalia made the practical point that police typically receive 
domestic violence calls in which the victim is a woman. 168 If the 
abuser is allowed to keep the police out of the home, the victim may 
be further harmed once the abuser shuts the door on the police. 169 In 
Randolph, the Supreme Court essentially broke a tie: two people with 
equal rights to the home disagreed over whether the police could 
enter. The majority found that the objection of the husband overruled 
the consent of the wife. 170 While the majority sided with the rights of 
the accused, it is Justice Scalia who reminded us that the 
overwhelming majority of victims in domestic assault cases are 
women. 
165. 547 U.s. 103, 142-45 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
166. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of 
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520 
(1992) (discussing feminist theory on protection of women from their abusers). 
167. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 145. 
168. See id. 
169. Id. at 127, 138-40 (Roberts, C.l, dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia). 
170. Id. at 106 (majority opinion) (holding that while police may enter a house, any 
evidence obtained will be suppressed when used against the objecting occupant). 
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3. Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
Justice Scalia wrote the majority OpInIOn in Brogan v. United 
States, which upheld the constitutionality of imposing criminal 
liability on a defendant for simply denying wrongdoing to 
investigators in violation of a federal statute. 171 Addressing the Fifth 
Amendment aspect of the case, Justice Scalia wrote that "[ w ]hether 
or not the predicament of the wrongdoer run to ground tugs at the 
heartstrings, neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment 
confers a privilege to lie.,,172 Thus, while a defendant is free to stand 
silent and say nothing in response to accusatory questions, he will be 
charged with a crime if he lies. 173 Justice Scalia's emphasis on the 
fact that innocent persons would not find themselves having to 
choose between lying and standing uncomfortably silent implies that 
he is not concerned with the guilty criminal, only the innocent 
accused. 
In Sixth Amendment cases, Justice Scalia has dissented from 
majority opinions involving codefendants' statements and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. 174 In his dissent from the majority's 
holding in Gray v. Maryland,175 Justice Scalia objected to the 
extension of a rule requiring that the defendant's name be omitted 
from a nontestifying codefendant's statement. 176 In Gray, the 
defendant's name was removed from the statement and replaced with 
blanks and the word deleted. 177 In finding that it did not fall within 
the class of statements to which Bruton'sl78 protective rule applies, 
Justice Scalia again interjected a real-world view into his dissent: 
The United States Constitution guarantees, not a perfect 
system of criminal justice (as to which there can be 
considerable disagreement), but a minimum standard of 
fairness. Lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, it 
171. 522 U.S. 398, 399, 404 (1998). 
172. Id. at 404. 
173. See id. 
174. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185,200 (1998) (codefendant's statements). 
175. 523 U.S. at 200. 
176. Id.; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (excluding evidence of 
codefendant's confession incriminating defendant when codefendant did not testify 
because it violates the Confrontation Clause). 
177. Gray, 523 U.S. at 188. 
178. 391 U.S. at 137 (holding that a nontestifying codefendant's confession that implicates 
a defendant is not admissible at their joint trial unless all references to the defendant 
are redacted). 
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should be borne in mind that federal and state rules of 
criminal procedure-which can afford to seek perfection 
because they can be more readily changed---exc1ude non-
testifying-codefendant confessions even where the Sixth 
Amendment does not. 179 
By emphasizing that protections for criminal defendants stem not 
only from the Sixth Amendment, but also from federal and state 
rules, Justice Scalia expressed his preference that the Court refrain 
from constitutionalizing procedural rules for criminal trials. 180 
Justice Scalia again argued that the Constitution does not guarantee 
a perfect system in his dissent from the holding in Padilla v. 
Kentucky. 181 Defendant Padilla pled guilty to a narcotics 
transportation charge without being warned by his attorney that he 
was subject to automatic deportation despite the fact he was a forty-
year legal resident of the United States and served in the United 
States anned forces during Vietnam. 182 Justice Scalia objected to the 
Court's stretching of the Sixth Amendment to fit this admittedly 
compelling case 183: "In the best of all possible worlds, criminal 
defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised of all 
serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to 
be misadvised. The Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose tool 
for judicial construction of a perfect world .... ,,184 While Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that the trial attorney gave inaccurate advice, he 
would not have overturned the conviction because the advice 
pertained to a collateral matter, deportation, which was not the 
subject of the case for which the defendant was entitled to effective 
assistance of counsel. 185 
In Dickerson v. United States,186 the Court held that an act of 
Congress did not have the authority to overrule Miranda v. Arizona 187 
because the warning system required by Miranda was 
179. Gray, 523 U.S. at 204. 
180. See supra Part II.A. (discussing how Justice Scalia repeatedly objects to the Court's 
development of new procedures that apply exclusively to capital punishment cases). 
181. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 1477-78 (majority opinion). 
183. See id. at 1494-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
184. Id. at 1494. 
185. Id. at 1494-97. 
186. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
187. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (noting that every person in police custody has the right to 
remain silent, which must be substantially conveyed to the suspect before he can 
knowingly and intelligently waive his right). 
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constitutionally based. 188 Justice Scalia dissented, finding that 
history, logic, and the Constitution compel overruling Miranda 189: 
"The Court therefore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when 
it denies effect to this Act of Congress.,,190 Because the Miranda 
decision did not hold that the Sixth Amendment required warnings, 
and subsequent cases clearly held that failure to warn a criminal 
defendant pursuant to Miranda did not violate the Constitution, 191 
Justice Scalia found that the Constitution requires the overruling of 
Miranda: 
I believe we cannot allow to remain on the books even a 
celebrated decision-especially a celebrated decision-that 
has come to stand for the proposition that the Supreme 
Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints 
upon Congress and the States. This is not the system that 
was established by the Framers .... 192 
The legislature is empowered with writing the laws, not the Supreme 
Court. Since the Court overstepped its role by writing into law that 
Miranda warnings must be given prior to a custodial interrogation, 
Justice Scalia believed that Miranda should be overtumed. 193 This 
result does not stem from an argument about the appropriate 
warnings given to criminal defendants but from the appropriate 
power that the Supreme Court should be exercising. 194 
Justice Scalia authored two recent opinions that appear to 
negatively impact the defendant's rights. Montejo v. Louisiana held 
that neither the defendant's request for counsel at arraignment nor the 
court's appointment of counsel invalidated a waiver to police-
initiated interrogation. 195 Recognizing that many criminal defendants 
188. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 
189. /d. at 448-50, 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
190. Jd. at 446. 
191. Justice Scalia wrote, 
The Court concedes only "that there is language in some of our 
opinions that supports the view that Miranda's protections are not 
'constitutionally required.'" It is not a matter of language; it is a 
matter of holdings. The proposition that failure to comply with 
Miranda's rules does not establish a constitutional violation was 
central to the holdings of Tucker, Hass, Quarles, and Elstad. 
Id. at 454 (citations omitted). 
192. Id. at 465. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086, 2092 (2009). 
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are indigent, Justice Scalia indicated that the appointment of counsel 
has become automatic in a number of states. 196 Therefore, requesting 
an attorney is not an assertion that the defendant wants his attorney 
before questioning begins: 197 
When a court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant in 
the absence of any request on his part, there is no basis for a 
presumption that any subsequent waiver of the right to 
counsel will be involuntary. There is no "initial election" to 
exercise the right .... No reason exists to assume that a 
defendant like Montejo, who has done nothing at all to 
express his intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment 
rights, would not be perfectly amenable to speaking with the 
police without having counsel present. And no reason exists 
to prohibit the police from inquiring. 198 
Montejo raises the concern that indigent defendants will have a more 
difficult time proving that a request for appointment of counsel meant 
that they did not want to speak with the police instead of merely 
requesting an attorney for trial. 199 Those who hire private counsel 
will undoubtedly expect the attorney to be an immediate barrier 
between the defendant and every interaction with the police and the 
prosecution. 200 
Justice Scalia minimized those concerns and found that such 
statements could still be challenged under the Sixth Amendmene01: 
"If Montejo made a clear assertion of the right to counsel when the 
officers approached him about accompanying them on the excursion 
for the murder weapon, then no interrogation should have taken place 
unless Montejo initiated it.,,202 Although Montejo decided a narrow 
issue, it may have significant impact: indigent defendants are not 
likely to share Justice Scalia's view that the relationship between 
police and suspects is between equals, in which the suspect can easily 
terminate the interview. 203 • 
Equally of concern is Maryland v. Shatzer, where a defendant's 
statements were ruled admissible after he asserted his right to silence 
196. Jd. at 2083. 
197. Jd. at 2086. 
198. Jd. at 2086-87 (citation omitted). 
199. Jd. at 2084. 
200. See id. at 2095 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
201. See id. at 2091-92 (majority opinion). 
202. Jd. at 2091. 
203. See id. at 2090. 
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because there was over a two-week break in custody between the first 
and second attempts at interrogation. 204 As a result, Mr. Shatzer's 
statement, taken after he had once asserted his Miranda rights, was 
not suppressed at his trial. 205 Yet the majority went much further than 
merely finding Mr. Shatzer's statement admissible, holding that once 
two weeks expire from the first interview in which the defendant 
invoked his Miranda rights, police may then contact the defendant 
again, re-Mirandize him, and then inquire if he wants to waive those 
previously asserted rights. 206 
Justice Scalia found that a break in custody lasting two weeks 
would be long enough between the first time a suspect is asked if he 
would like to speak with police and declines, and the second time he 
is asked. 207 Justice Scalia wrote that "14 days .... provides plenty of 
time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult 
with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive 
effects of his prior custody.,,208 In holding that police may once again 
question a suspect fourteen days after he has asserted his Miranda 
rights, the Court likely encourages the police to find a way to exploit 
the rules, similar to the technique used when police had defendants 
confess first, Mirandized them, and then have them confess again. 209 
The Court's ruling in Shatzer invites similar police manipulation of 
suspects and thus negatively impacts the rights of the accused. 2Io 
Justice Scalia explained the historical relationship between the 
judiciary and the grand jury system in United States v. Williams. 211 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that the circuit court 
cannot interfere with the independence of the grand jury by writing 
regulations requiring a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to 
it. 212 His opinion relied upon an historical explanation of the role of 
the grand jury as well as precedent that other constitutional rules do 
204. 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1227 (2010). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1222-23. 
207. Jd. at 1223. 
208. Id. 
209. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004) (striking down the police 
department's practice of interrogating a suspect without advising them of their 
Miranda rights, getting a confession, and then obtaining a Miranda waiver and having 
the suspect recite his or her prior confession). 
210. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1227 n.l (Thomas, 1., concurring) (noting different 
techniques that police officers could use in an attempt to manipulate suspects). 
211. 504 U.S. 36,47 (1992). 
212. Id.at45,47. 
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not apply to the grand jury.213 "In fact the whole theory of its 
function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional 
Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the 
Government and the people.,,214 While this ruling did not benefit 
criminal defendants, Justice Scalia noted that the role of the grand 
jury was to preserve power for the people instead of the 
governmental authorities. 215 Justice Scalia also suggested that 
"Congress is free to prescribe" rules requiring that exculpatory 
material be presented to the grand jury but that the courts do not have 
such authority. 216 
In Mitchell v. United States, Justice Scalia dissented from the 
majority holding that the Fifth Amendment prevents a sentencing 
judge from drawing an adverse inference from the defendant's 
silence during a sentencing hearing.217 The Court limited its ruling to 
prevent a sentencing judge from drawing an adverse inference in 
determining facts relating to the circumstances and details of the 
crime. 218 Justice Scalia agreed that the Fifth Amendment allows the 
defendant to remain silent at sentencing but found the majority's 
holding historically inconsistent, unworkable, and ludicrous-in light 
of the fact that the sentencing judge's entire role during sentencing is 
to determine the facts and judge what sentence is appropriate for the 
defendant. 219 Emphasizing the impracticality of the majority's 
opinion, Justice Scalia indicated that the Court itself was embarrassed 
by its own ruling: 
Today's opinion states, in as inconspicuous a manner as 
possible at the very end of its analysis (one imagines that if 
the statement were delivered orally it would be spoken in a 
213. ld. at 47-49. Justice Scalia wrote, 
In United States v. Calandra, . . . a grand jury witness faced 
questions that were allegedly based upon physical evidence the 
Government had obtained through a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; we rejected the proposal that the exclusionary rule 
be extended to grand jury proceedings . . . . [W]e declined to 
enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceedings, since that 
"would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury 
institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by 
technical rules." 
Jd. at 50 (quoting Castello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956». 
214. Jd. at 47 (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960». 
215. ld. 
216. ld.at55. 
217. 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
218. ld. at 328 (majority opinion). 
219. See id. at 338-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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very low voice, and with the Court's hand over its mouth), 
that its holding applies only to inferences drawn from 
silence "in determining the facts of the offense.,,22o 
719 
Since the ruling requires the "[sentencing] judge to avert his eyes 
from the elephant in the courtroom when it is the judge's job to size 
up the elephant,,,221 Justice Scalia predicted that the impracticality of 
this ruling will produce more litigation attempting to understand what 
the Court meant. 222 
Justice Scalia wrote a wide variety of decisions that negatively 
impact criminal defendants. 223 His original meaning approach to 
analyzing the Constitution results in rulings that reflect the criminal 
procedure status during the Revolutionary War Era. 224 Such an 
approach may favor the prosecution, especially in death penalty 
cases. 225 However, in areas of wide applicability that are commonly 
prosecuted, Justice Scalia's decisions have had a hugely positive 
impact on the rights of the criminal defendant. 
III. JUSTICE SCALIA FOR THE DEFENSE 
Justice Scalia's positive impact on the rights of criminal defendants 
has been largely unnoted. Justice Scalia has authored a variety of 
220. Id. at 339. 
221. Id. at 341. 
222. Id. at 340. 
223. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009) (holding that a criminal 
defendant's request for counsel at arraignment does not give rise to a presumption that 
a subsequent waiver of Miranda rights is invalid); Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 
79 (2000) (holding that a prosecutor calling the jury's attention to the fact that the 
defendant had the opportunity to hear all other witnesses testify and tailor his 
testimony accordingly does not violate his right to be present at trial and confront his 
accusers); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,574 (2005) (holding that imposing capital punishment on a 
16- or 17-year-old murderer is not cruel and unusual). 
224. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S, 36, 53-54 (2004) (applying an originalist 
analysis and holding that the Confrontation Clause excludes testimonial hearsay 
statements); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512-14 (1995) (using an 
originalist analysis to hold that a judge may not withhold any element of a criminal 
offense from the jury); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (using an 
originalist analysis and holding that a sentence that is not otherwise cruel and unusual 
does not become unconstitutional because it is mandatory). 
225. See Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism's Uneasy 
Relationship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 984-85 (2010) ("[V]iewed through 
[the lens of an originalist], the death penalty, having been in the late eighteenth 
century neither unusual nor considered cruel, is constitutionally permissible."). 
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opinions in which the rights of the criminal defendant were upheld, 
even against long-accepted prosecutorial procedures. 226 Justice 
Scalia has authored both majority and dissenting opinions that favor 
the criminal defendant, in areas of law including the Sixth 
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Whatever his underlying rationale for these decisions, their impact 
benefits every single criminal defendant. 
A. Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence. 227 
1. To Be Confronted with the Witnesses Against Him 
Justice Scalia has long adhered to the text of the Sixth Amendment 
in arguing for a strong defense of the right of the accused to confront 
the witnesses against him. Early in his tenure on the Supreme Court, 
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Cruz v. New York, 
holding that the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant's confession at Cruz's trial because the 
confession was not admissible against defendant Cruz, only against 
the codefendant. 228 Justice Scalia wrote that the factors that must be 
considered for admission of the codefendant's statement were 
identical to those announced in Bruton 229 ; "[T]he likelihood that the 
instruction [to not consider the codefendant's confession against 
Cruz] will be disregarded; the probability that such disregard will 
have a devastating effect; and the determinability of these facts in 
advance of trial. ,,230 Thus, the Court held that the confession by the 
nontestifying codefendant could not be introduced at a joint trial, 
226. See infra Part lILA.l. 
227. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
228. 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987). 
229. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1968); see also supra note 178 and 
accompanying text. 
230. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193 (citations omitted). 
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even if the jury was instructed to disregard it and even if the 
defendant's own confession were admissible. 231 
In Cruz, Justice Scalia adhered to the text of the Constitution and to 
the earlier Bruton decision that found the nontestifying codefendant's 
statement to be "evidence" against the defendant even when it was 
not admitted against him at all, but only against the codefendant. 232 
Justice Scalia emphasized the fact that the jury would likely consider 
the nontesifying codefendant's confession against the defendant and 
noted that the defendant was likely objecting to the admission of the 
codefendant's confession precisely because he is distancing himself 
from his own confession233: "But in the real world of criminal 
litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession--on the 
ground that it was not accurately reported, or that it was not really 
true when made.,,234 The inability of the defendant to confront the 
nontestifying codefendant through cross-examination resulted in the 
majority's ruling against the admissibility of such statements. 235 
Particularly extraordinary considering the timing of the decision, in 
Coy v. Iowa,236 Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion that 
strongly protects the Confrontation Clause during an era when there 
was widespread hysteria concerning child-sexual-abuse cases237 and 
various attempts were being made in the criminal justice system to 
make testifying in a courtroom less upsetting and stressful for child 
witnesses. 238 In Coy, the defendant was accused of sexually 
assaulting two girls who were camping outside in a backyard tent. 239 
Over the defense's objection, the trial court allowed a screen to 
separate the defendant from the victims while they testified. 240 The 
defendant could "dimly" see the girls, but they could not see him.241 
23l. Id. 
232. Id. at 192-93. 
233. See id. at 191-93. 
234. Id. at 192. 
235. Id. at 193. 
236. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
237. See, e.g., McMartin v. Children's Inst. Int'l, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1393 (1989) (discussing 
alleged child abuse which occurred at a preschool in the city of Manhattan, 
California). 
238. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (holding the necessary use of one-
way closed-circuit television to obtain testimony of a child witness in a child abuse 
case does not violate the Confrontation Clause). 
239. 487 U.S. at 1014. 
240. Id. at 1014-15. 
24l. Id. 
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The Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case because of 
the Sixth Amendment violation. 242 
Explaining the importance of the Confrontation Clause, Justice 
Scalia stressed in the holding in Coy that "[t]his opinion is 
embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity in part 
to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards 
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential 
to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution. ",243 Throughout his 
subsequent Sixth Amendment decisions, Justice Scalia consistently 
returns to this theme and to the history of the right to confront 
witnesses. 
In Coy, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Confrontation Clause 
demands the defendant and the accuser be able to see each other 
during the testimony, despite the fact that witnesses may be 
traumatized by the courtroom experience: "That face-to-face 
presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused 
child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false 
accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a 
truism that constitutional protections have costS.,,244 The costs Justice 
Scalia referenced include the negative impact on the prosecution's 
case. 245 In contrast, the criminal defendant benefits from this 
decision. 246 Justice Scalia's description of the importance of face-to-
face confrontation demonstrates not only his commitment to the 
original meaning of the Constitution, but also his ability to view 
issues from both the prosecution and the defense perspective. 
Crawford v. Washington continued Justice Scalia's movement to 
return the Court to the original meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause-one that is extraordinarily protective of the rights of the 
accused. 247 Crawford held that even reliable hearsay, when 
testimonial in nature, is inadmissible unless the defendant was 
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness pursuant to the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 248 In Crawford, the 
Court rejected the decades of precedent following Ohio v. Roberts249 
that allowed judges to determine the admissibility of hearsay based 
242. Id. at 1022. 
243. ld. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)). 
244. ld. at 1020. 
245. See id. 
246. See id. 
247. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
248. ld. at 68. 
249. 488 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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upon reliability factors. 25o Writing for the Crawford majority, Justice 
Scalia expressed the accused's perspective, stating that "[d]ispensing 
with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. 
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.,,251 Instead, the 
Sixth Amendment prescribes that the defendant have the opportunity 
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him.,,252 Justice Scalia 
wrote that simply applying the right to confront accusers is the best 
test for reliability of evidence. 253 
In so deciding, Justice Scalia emphasized the absurd rulings that 
resulted from the application of the former Ohio v. Roberts reliability 
test, because "[ w ]hether a statement [was] deemed reliable 
depend[ ed] heavily on which factors the judge consider[ ed] and how 
much weight he accord[ ed] each of them. Some courts w[ ound] up 
attaching the same significance to opposite facts.,,254 There was no 
predictability or rational explanation for why some statements were 
admitted pursuant to the reliability test and others were excluded. 255 
Justice Scalia found such a result to be fundamentally unfair to the 
criminal defendant. 256 
Justice Scalia reminds us that the Framers feared the power of 
governmene57: "They knew that judges, like other government 
officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the 
people .... ,,258 Justice Scalia articulated a concern held by modem 
criminal defendants as well: the massive power of the government 
will override the rights of the defendant. 259 Justice Scalia's 
empathetic response to the plight of the criminal defendant, combined 
with the fact that he did not express any concern about the adverse 
impact of this decision on the ability to convict defendants, is what is 
so surprising about his opinion in this case. 
Finally, Justice Scalia concluded in Crawford that the best test of 
the reliability of evidence is the framework designed by the drafters 
250. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-69; Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66. 
251. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (emphasis omitted). 
252. ld. at 42 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
253. ld. at 69. 
254. ld. at 63. 
255. ld. 
256. ld. at 61. 
257. ld. at 66 ("The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be 
admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by 'neutral' government 
officers."). 
258. ld. at 67. 
259. See id. at 56 n.7. 
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of the Constitution. 260 The Sixth Amendment "commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. ,,261 Justice 
Scalia distinguished the admissibility of certain hearsay exceptions 
from evidence that is testimonial in nature and therefore barred by the 
Confrontation Clause262: "Where testimonial evidence is at issue, 
however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law 
required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.,,263 The issue left unresolved by Crawford was a 
comprehensive definition of testimonial evidence. 264 
Two years later, Justice Scalia had the opportunity to expand on his 
definition of testimonial evidence. In Davis v. Washington, the Court 
granted certiorari on two domestic violence cases; statements made 
by the victim at the scene were admitted into evidence over the 
defense's objection that the victim did not appear to testify and to be 
cross-examined. 265 Domestic violence cases are notorious for having 
reluctant witnesses, who are either too afraid of the defendant to 
testify or who have reconciled with the defendant and therefore no 
longer wish to prosecute. 266 In response to witness reluctance, courts 
either routinely allowed the police officer to recount the witness 
statements or, as in Davis, played recordings of the witness's 
statement for the jury. 267 
During these highly charged, emotional cases, Justice Scalia coolly 
demanded Sixth Amendment confrontation, despite the difficulties 
for the prosecution and that criminal defendants will likely be 
acquitted for lack of evidence. Domestic-violence victims also argued 
that the nature of domestic violence requires "greater flexibility in the 
260. ld. at 67. 
261. ld. at 61. 
262. ld. at 56. 
263. ld. at 68. 
264. ld. However, Justice Scalia did give some guidance as to the meaning of testimonial 
evidence: 
ld. 
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of 'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers, it 
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, 
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations. These are the modem practices with closet kinship 
to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed. 
265. 547 U.S. 813, 817, 828 (2006). 
266. See Sarah Rogers, Note, Online Dispute Resolution: An Option for Mediation in the 
Midst ofGendered Violence, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 349,367-68 (2009). 
267. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 817 ("The relevant statements in Davis v. Washington, No. 05-
5224, were made to a 911 emergency operator .... "). 
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use of testimonial evidence [because domestic violence] is 
notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to 
ensure that she does not testify at trial.,,268 Nevertheless, Justice 
Scalia found that the Constitution prefers that the guilty go free rather 
than convicting defendants who did not have the opportunity to 
confront the witnesses against them. 269 
Justice Scalia defined the terms and explained the difference 
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements for purposes of 
the Confrontation Clause: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 
They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution. 270 
Criminal defendants could not have found a more pro-defense 
version of the definition of testimonial statements than this one 
announced by Justice Scalia. Excepting the beginning sections of 
emergency 9-1-1 recordings, virtually every statement to a police 
officer investigating a crime becomes testimonial under this 
definition. 271 
Justice Scalia continued his defense-oriented interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause in Giles v. California, which concerned the 
issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing272 and mentioned briefly in the 
Davis decision.273 In Giles, the complaining witness had been killed 
by the defendant prior to trial. 274 The issue for the Court was whether 
the defendant's killing of the witness was enough for the defendant to 
forfeit his right to object to admission of her former statement 
concerning a prior assault charge or whether there had to be evidence 
268. Id. at 832-33. 
269. See id. at 833. 
270. Id. at 822. 
27l. See id. 
272. 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008). 
273. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 ("That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by 
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation. We take no position on 
the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture .... "). 
274. Giles, 554 U.S. at 357. 
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that the defendant killed her to keep her from becoming a witness 
against him. 275 Justice Scalia examined the common law rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing and found that the prosecution must 
demonstrate the defendant's intent prior to admission of such 
testimony: "The terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule 
suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged 
in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.,,276 
Justice Scalia emphasized that a straightforward application of the 
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights demanded this result: "It is 
not the role of courts to extrapolate from the words of the Sixth 
Amendment to the values behind it, and then to enforce its guarantees 
only to the extent they serve ... those underlying values."m In other 
words, the Confrontation Clause requires that the defendant be given 
the opportunity to confront the witnesses. Prior to the admission of 
any nonconfronted statements against the defendant, the prosecution 
must prove both that it is the defendant's fault the witness is 
unavailable and that the defendant intended to make the witness 
unavailable to testify. 278 
Justice Scalia acknowledged the concern that the prosecution of 
domestic violence cases may be more difficult as a result of this 
ruling, but he nevertheless refused to return to the procedure of 
having judges admit statements into evidence based on an Ohio v. 






In any event, we are puzzled by the dissent's decision to 
devote its peroration to domestic abuse cases. Is the 
suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause 
(the one the Framers adopted and Crawford described) for 
all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation 
Clause for those crimes that are frequently directed against 
women? Domestic violence is an intolerable offense that 
legislatures may choose to combat through many means-
from increasing criminal penalties to adding resources for 
investigation and prosecution to funding awareness and 
prevention campaigns. But for that serious crime, as for 
others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants is not in the State's arsenal. 279 
Id. 
Id. at 359. 
Id. at 375. 
Id. at 359-61. 
Id. at 376. 
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Domestic violence cases fill many court dockets, and some 
jurisdictions have developed family courts or other specialty courts to 
handle the large number of cases. 280 These cases were routinely 
prosecuted through the nonconfronted statements of witnesses who 
did not appear to testify.281 Justice Scalia's opinion unconditionally 
defended the rights of the criminal defendant in a situation that has 
widespread impact in frequently prosecuted domestic violence 
cases.282 
Expanding on his defense-oriented interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts. 283 The Court held that routine laboratory 
analyses of narcotics, which had long been introduced into evidence 
by affidavit, were testimonial hearsay. 284 In order to introduce the 
results of such testing, the analyst must testify in person, meet the 
requirements of an "unavailable" witness under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804, or the defendant must waive his objection to the 
analyst's absence. 285 In his holding, Justice Scalia rejected the 
Government's suggestion that the defense could have subpoenaed the 
analysts if the defense wanted to ask them questions: "[T]he 
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present 
its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses 
into COurt.,,286 Justice Scalia remarked that the issue in this case was 
straightforward and dictated by the ruling in Crawford: "The Sixth 
Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex 
parte out-of-court affidavits.,,287 The admission of the analysis of the 
narcotics over the defense objection was reversible error. 288 
Justice Scalia dissented from the ruling in Michigan v. Bryant that 
the Confrontation Clause was not violated when a dying victim's 
280. See Amy Karan et ai., Domestic Violence Courts: What Are They and How Should We 
Manage Them?, 50 Juv. &FAM. CT. J. 75, 75-76 (1999). 
281. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 751-52 
(2005). 
282. See id. at 748-50. 
283. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
284. ld. at 2530-33; id. at 2543-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court sweeps away an 
accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence."). 
285. See id. at 2532, 2540-42 (majority opinion). 
286. ld. at 2540. Justice Scalia continued, articulating the defendant's perspective: "[The 
Confrontation Clause's] value to the defendant is not replaced by a system in which 
the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the 
defendant to subpoena the affiants ifhe chooses." ld. 
287. ld. at 2542. 
288. ld. 
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statements were admitted under the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule. 289 Justice Scalia first criticizes the majority's 
justification: 
Today's tale-a story of five officers conducting 
successive examinations of a dying man with the 
primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his 
testimony regarding his killer, but of protecting him, 
them, and others from a murderer somewhere on the 
loose-is so transparently false that professing to 
believe it demeans this institution. 290 
Justice Scalia's dissent further accused the majority of attempting 
to overturn the Crawford line of cases, arguing that "perhaps as an 
intended second goal-today's opinion distorts our Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in shambles.,,291 
In its analysis, the Bryant case focused on the reliability of the 
hearsay statements, which was the exact reasoning that the Court had 
overruled in the Crawford decision. 292 Justice Scalia forcefully 
dissented from the Bryant majority and asserted the rights of the 
criminal defendant, despite the fact that without the victim's 
statements the defendant may not have been convicted.293 He further 
reiterates his rejection of admitting statements without confrontation: 
[W]e did not disavow multifactor balancing for 
reliability in Crawford out of a preference for rules 
over standards. We did so because it "d[id] violence 
to" the Framers' design. It was judges' open-ended 
determination of what was reliable that violated the 
trial rights of Englishmen in the political trials of the 
16th and 17th centuries ..... Not even the least 
dangerous branch can be trusted to assess the 
reliability of uncross-examined testimony in 
politically charged trials or trials implicating threats to 
national security. 294 
289. 131 s. Ct. 1143,1168 (2011). 
290. ld. 
291. ld. 
292. ld. at 1174. 
293. ld. at 1171-72. 
294. ld. at 1176. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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Justice Scalia found that because the primary purpose of the police 
questioning was obviously to catch and prosecute the defendant, the 
statements were testimonial and inadmissible without cross-
examination. 295 
Justice Scalia's response to any concerns that these Confrontation 
Clause decisions will negatively impact the prosecution demonstrates 
that he is a staunch defender of the rights of the accused: "The 
Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more 
burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and 
the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause-
like those other constitutional provisions-is binding, and we may 
not disregard it at our convenience.,,296 Justice Scalia also brushed 
aside concerns that requiring the laboratory analyst to testify will 
overburden the criminal justice systern297 as irrelevant to whether or 
not the defendant is afforded his rights pursuant to the Constitution. 298 
2. To Have the Assistance of Counsel for His Defense 
Justice Scalia has also defended the right to counsel. In United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and 
held that the defendant's right to an attorney of his choice is not 
subject to a harmless-error analysis. 299 On appeal, the government 
conceded that the district court erred when it denied Gonzalez-Lopez 
the right to hire a specific attorney. 300 Justice Scalia held that the 
right to counsel contains the right to have the attorney who the 
defendant chooses when the defendant is paying. 301 Analogizing to 
Crawford, which rejected the long line of cases that allow statements 
not subject to cross-examination into evidence and thus depriving the 
defendant of his right to confront witnesses,302 Justice Scalia stated 
that when the right to counsel of choice is denied, the question does 
not become, was the trial fair? Instead, the test remains, did the 
defendant have the attorney he chose represent him?303 
295. [d. at 1172. 
296. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009). 
297. "[T]here is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt in the 
States that, one way or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst's 
appearance attrial." [d. at 2541. 
298. See id. at 2540-42. 
299. 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006). 
300. [d. 
301. See id. at 144; cf Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (distinguishing from 
right to choose attorney when counsel is court-appointed). 
302. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
303. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146. 
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Because Gonzalez-Lopez was not allowed his attorney of choice, 
the district court committed reversible error304: "Where the right to be 
assisted by counsel of one's choice is wrongly denied, therefore, it is 
unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to 
establish a Sixth Amendment violation.,,305 While the dissent focused 
on the fairness of the trial, Justice Scalia refused to join in that 
discussion. Similar to Crawford, Justice Scalia argued that the 
Constitution means at least what it says. 306 
Justice Scalia forcefully dissented from the majority's ruling in 
Indiana v. Edwards and posited that the mentally ill can be denied 
their right to self-representation. 307 The Supreme Court had 
previously held in Faretta v. California that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel also contains within it a right to self-representation308 
and in Godinez v. Moran that the test for competency to waive 
counsel is the same as the standard for competence to stand trial. 309 
However, the Edwards Court held that if mentally ill defendants are 
competent to stand trial yet their mental illness makes them 
incompetent to represent themselves at trial, then appointed counsel 
can be forced upon them over their objection and can overrule any 
decision the defendant makes concerning his own defense. 310 
Justice Scalia considered this issue from the perspective of the 
criminal defendant. He emphasized two objections to the majority's 
decision to force defendants to accept representation.3\) First, this 
decision strips the right to present a defense away from the accused 
because the forced attorney can ignore the defendant's preferred 
defense: "But to hold that a defendant may be deprived of the right to 
make legal arguments for acquittal simply because a state-selected 
304. ld. at 152. 
305. ld. at 148. 
306. See id. at 146. 
307. 554 U.S. 164, 167 (2008). 
308. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). 
309. 509 U.S. 389,391 (1993). 
310. Edwards, 544 U.S. at 167; see also Joanmarie lIaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet 
Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 313,315-17 (2009) (discussing problems 
with the competency standard). 
31l. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 179-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated, 
The right reflects a "nearly universal conviction, on the part of our 
people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an 
unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself 
if he truly wants to do so. . .. [I]n the long history of British 
criminal jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever 
adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant 
in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber." 
ld. at 182 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807,821). 
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agent has made different arguments on his behalf is ... to 'imprison a 
man in his privileges and call it the Constitution. ",312 Secondly, 
Justice Scalia argued that the majority allows mentally ill defendants 
to be treated as less equal under the law: "In singling out mentally ill 
defendants for this treatment, the Court's opinion does not even have 
the questionable virtue of being politically correct.,,313 Finally, 
Justice Scalia noted that in the Edwards case itself, the forced 
attorney did no better than the defendant could have done pro se: the 
defendant was convicted despite the trial court's decision that the 
defendant needed forced representation to save him from himself. 314 
Both Gonzalez-Lopez and Edwards demonstrate that Justice 
Scalia's impact on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel strongly 
favors the accused. Both cases inject a realist's focus into the 
criminal justice system by discussing how these situations will play 
out in an actual courtroom. While the holdings discuss two separate 
aspects of right to counsel, they both stress the importance of the 
defendant's ability to make this decision, which is of paramount 
importance to him or herself, as opposed to allowing the government, 
which is already prosecuting him and judging him, to additionally 
decide what is best for his defense. Such a perspective that so clearly 
expresses the viewpoint of the accused is criminal-rights oriented. 
3. By an Impartial Jury315 
Justice Scalia dissented from the majority decision in Georgia v. 
McCollum, which held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited a 
defendant from utilizing peremptory challenges to strike jurors based 
on race. 316 While McCollum certainly had the commendable goal of 
312. Id. at 189 (quoting Adams v. U.S. ex reI. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)). 
313. Id. 
314. See id. Justice Scalia wrote, 
Id. 
The facts of this case illustrate this point with the utmost 
clarity. Edwards wished to take a self-defense case to the jury. 
His counsel preferred a defense that focused on lack of intent. 
Having been denied the right to conduct his own defense, 
Edwards was convicted without having had the opportunity to 
present to the jury the grounds he believed supported his 
innocence. 
315. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Justice Scalia finds that the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
clause works in conjunction with the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial to require 
jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-
10 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993). 
316. 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Id. at 69 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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eliminating racial discrimination, Justice Scalia objected to both the 
fiction of considering a defendant to be a "state actor,,3!7 for purposes 
applying the Equal Protection Clause to him and also to the Court's 
interference with the defendant's use of preemptory challenges3!8: "In 
the interest . of promoting the supposedly greater good of race 
relations in the society as a whole[,] ... we use the Constitution to 
destroy the ages-old right of criminal defendants to exercise 
peremptory challenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they 
consider fair.,,319 Justice Scalia exhibited a profound understanding 
of the issue in this case for the criminal defendant. 
When exercising peremptory challenges, criminal defendants are 
not acting for the state, despite the majority's ruling.320 To suggest 
this to a criminal defendant would be absurd: In whose interests are 
you exercising these strikes? Is it the government's? The least 
legally learned criminal defendants understand that it is in their 
interest, and theirs alone, to have jurors sympathetic to them on the 
jury, and to remove jurors who may be hostile to them -even if there 
is a slight chance the hostility stems from the juror's race. The irony 
of the McCollum case is that prosecutors historically were the ones 
using racially based strikes to discriminate against the criminal 
defendant. 321 Justice Scalia's dissent explained the absurdity of 
concluding that a criminal defendant used racially based strikes in a 
manner to discriminate, instead of to benefit, the criminal 
defendant. 322 Only the defendant's rights are at risk during a criminal 
trial. 323 
Justice Scalia's defense of the jury trial system also has included 
his insistence that the jury make findings of guilt by the standard of 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held 
that the Louisiana jury instruction on reasonable doube24 was 
317. Jd. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A criminal defendant, in the process of defending 
himself against the state, is held to be acting on behalf of the state."). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Jd. at 64-65 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting). 
321. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 & n.3 (1986). 
322. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 69-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
323. See id. 
324. Here is the instruction: 
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element 
necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give 
him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. 
Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it 
does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable 
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constitutionally flawed. 325 Writing for the majority three years later 
in Sullivan v. Louisiana, Justice Scalia found that the exact same jury 
instruction constituted reversible error in a case where the defendant 
had been sentenced to death326 : "The right to a trial by jury reflects, 
we have said, 'a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered.' The deprivation of that 
right ... unquestionably qualifies as 'structural error. ",327 Justice 
Scalia emphasized that the jury must make findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for a verdict to be constitutionally valid328 : 
"But the essential connection to a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' factual 
finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a 
misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's 
findings." 329 Thus, Justice Scalia overturned a death sentence 
because of an improper burden of proof instruction without 
expressing any concern that he was enabling a defendant who was 
probably guilty to escape a death sentence. 
Similarly, United States v. Gaudin330 reiterated the Court's position 
that the Fifth Amendment due process rights combined with the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial "require criminal convictions to rest 
upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every 
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.,,331 Rejecting three arguments by the government to the 
contrary, Justice Scalia made the constitutional issue in Gaudin seem 
both obvious and simple: "The Constitution gives a criminal 
defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the 
elements of the crime with which he is charged; one of the elements 
in the present case is materiality; respondent therefore had a right to 
one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial 
basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such 
doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your 
mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or 
lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It 
is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man 
can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or 
mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty. 
State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La. 1989) (emphasis added). 
325. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39,41 (1990) (per curiam). 
326. 508 U.S. 275,278 (1993). 
327. Id. at 281-82 (citation omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 
(1968)). 
328. Id. at 278. 
329. Id. at 281. 
330. 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
331. Id. at 510 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993)). 
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have the jury decide materiality.,,332 Because the trial court withheld 
from the jury the issue of materiality of Gaudin's false statements and 
made that finding by itself, Gaudin's conviction was reversed. 333 
Justice Scalia revisited the issue of jury determination of guilt and 
dissented from the majority opinion in Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States. 334 The majority held that a statute authorizing an increased 
sentence for an aggravating element was merely a sentencing factor 
that did not need to be considered by the jury. 335 
The approach used by Justice Scalia in Gaudin reappeared in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 336 The majority found that the prosecutor 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when 
the prosecutor filed a motion alleging new facts after the defendant 
had entered a guilty plea, which enhanced the defendant's death 
penalty sentence. 337 The Court held that any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 338 
In his Apprendi concurrence, Justice Scalia reminded the Court of 
the origins of the right to a jury trial: "Judges, it is sometimes 
necessary to remind ourselves, are part of the State.... The 
founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave 
[criminal justice] to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee 
was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. ,,339 
Justice Scalia found that the right to a jury trial necessitates that the 
jury make any findings that result in a verdict or enhance a sentence: 
And the guarantee that "in all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an impartial 
jury," has no intelligible content unless it means that all the 
facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a 
legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury. 340 
Once again, Justice Scalia articulated the most pro-defense position 
of all the Justices: if a jury cannot make a finding beyond a 
332. Jd. at 511. 
333. Id. at 522-23. 
334. 523 U.S. 224,248 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
335. Jd. at 226 (majority opinion). 
336. 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000). 
337. Id. at 470-71, 475-76. 
338. Id. at 475-76. 
339. Jd. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
340. !d. at 499 (alteration in original). 
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reasonable doubt that a specific factor exists, then a judge cannot 
consider that factor when imposing a sentence. 341 
Perhaps Justice Scalia's strongest defense of the right to a jury trial, 
as well as his loudest condemnation of the erosion of that right, came 
in his concurrence in the case Ring v. Arizona. 342 The majority in 
Ring held that the jury, not the judge, must find the existence of 
aggravating factors in a death penalty case. 343 Justice Scalia wrote 
separately, giving as one of his rationales the following: 
[M]y observing over the past 12 years the accelerating 
propensity of both state and federal legislatures to adopt 
"sentencing factors" determined by judges that increase 
punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury's verdict, 
and my witnessing the belief of a near majority of my 
colleagues that this novel practice is perfectly OK, cause me 
to believe that our people's traditional belief in the right of 
trial by jury is in perilous decline. That decline is bound to 
be confirmed, and indeed accelerated, by the repeated 
spectacle of a man's going to his death because a judge 
found that an aggravating factor existed. We cannot 
preserve our veneration for the protection of the jury in 
criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for 
that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty 
without it. 344 
Justice Scalia's position seems extraordinary, given his earlier 
writings concerning the legitimacy of the death penalty. 345 For 
Justice Scalia, the death penalty's legitimacy derives from the 
legislature and from the imposition of it by a jury, but never from 
judicial power. 346 
Writing for the majority in Blakely v. Washington, Justice Scalia 
reaffIrmed the accused's right to a jury trial. 347 After pleading guilty 
to second-degree kidnapping of his wife, an additional three years 
were added to the defendant's sentence when a judge found the 
341. ld. at 498-99. 
342. 536 U.S. 584,610-14 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
343. ld. at 609 (majority opinion). 
344. ld. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
345. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
346. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 611-12 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
347. 542 U.S. 296, 305-06, 313-14 (2004). 
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aggravating factor of "deliberate cruelty.,,348 The second-degree 
kidnapping charge did not include the element of deliberate cruelty, 
and the defendant objected to the trial judge making that finding after 
the guilty plea. 349 Pursuant to the holding in Apprendi, the Court 
reversed Blakely's conviction because a judge, and not a jury, made 
findings as to the aggravating factor that enhanced the defendant's 
sentence. 350 
In Blakely, Justice Scalia not only reviewed the history of the right 
to a jury trial, but he also responded to his critics who alleged that 
Apprendi negatively impacts criminal defendants. Referencing 
history, Justice Scalia stressed that "[j]ust as suffrage ensures the 
people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, 
jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary."351 Justice 
Scalia argued that ensuring that the jury must make findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt prior to sentencing enhancement does not 
negatively impact criminal defendants: "When a defendant pleads 
guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so 
long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents 
to judicial factfinding.,,352 Justice Scalia thus asserted that the plea 
bargaining power of the defendant is not harmed and may even be 
strengthened by the reasoning or the holdings in Apprendi and 
Blakely. 353 
348. Id. at 299-300. 
349. Id. at 298-300. 
350. Id. at 301, 303-05. 
351. Id. at 306. Ressponding to Justice Breyer's dissent, the majority via Justice Scalia 
assereds that Apprendi does not harm the defendant's position in plea bargaining, and 
anyway, 
the Sixth Amendment was not written for the benefit of those who 
choose to forgo its protection. It guarantees the right to jury trial. 
It does not guarantee that a particular number of jury trials will 
actually take place. That more defendants elect to waive that right 
(because, for example, the government at the moment is not 
particularly oppressive) does not prove that a constitutional 
provision guaranteeing availability of that option is disserved. 
Id. at 312. 
352. Id. at 310. 
353. Justice Scalia wrote, 
The implausibility of Justice Breyer's contention that Apprendi 
is unfair to criminal defendants is exposed by the lineup of amici 
in this case. It is hard to believe that the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers was somehow duped into arguing for 
the wrong side. Justice Breyer's only authority asking that 
defendants be protected from Apprendi is an article written not by 
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These cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment benefit criminal 
defendants because they view the trial through the eyes of the 
criminal defendant. Justice Scalia's holdings in the area of Sixth 
Amendment law have widespread impact. His Confrontation Clause 
cases ensure that a defendant's objections to hearsay will be tested, 
not only under evidentiary hearsay exceptions, but under the more 
demanding rules barring admission of out-of-court testimonial 
statements. 
These rulings significantly impact widely and routinely prosecuted 
crimes such as narcotics violations and driving while intoxicated 
cases. Indeed, until fiscal year 2009, cases involving narcotics 
charges were the most common type of case currently prosecuted in 
federal court. 354 Justice Scalia deferred to defendants' choice in the 
area of assistance of counsel, demanding that criminal defendants be 
afforded their constitutional rights. 355 Finally, Justice Scalia's rulings 
on the right to a jury trial have contributed to the powerful decline356 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and have given defendants the 
power of knowledge: no longer do they plead guilty to one crime and 
get sentenced for another. A jury must make that decision, unless a 
defendant stipulates to such additional facts.357 
B. Double Jeopardy 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service 
in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
a criminal defense lawyer but by a law professor and fonner 
prosecutor. 
!d. at 312. Justice Scalia continues his approach in his dissent in United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005), arguing that the majority's opinion disregarded the historical practice 
of "having juries find the facts that expose a defendant to increased prison time." ld. at 304 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
354. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 
2009, at 5 (2010), available at http:/www.ussc.govlResearchlResearch]ublicationsi 
2010/20101230 JY09 _Overview Jederal_ Criminal_ Cases.pdf. 
355. See supra Part IIl.A.2. 
356. See Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 JUDICATURE 
180, 180--81 (1995). 
357. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310. 
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be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 358 
Justice Scalia wrote the decision in United States v. Dixon, finding 
the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar prosecution of an underlying 
criminal charge once a defendant had been convicted of criminal 
contempt for violating a civil protection order. 359 The Dixon360 case 
split the court between those Justices who asserted that double 
jeopardy never bars such prosecutions and those who felt all 
subsequent prosecutions were barred. 361 Justice Scalia wrote that 
criminal charges may be prosecuted after a criminal conviction for 
violation of a civil protection only when they have different 
elements. 362 
Justice Scalia noted that the "same-elements test... inquires 
whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; 
if not, they are the 'same offence' and double jeopardy bars 
additional punishment and successive prosecution.,,363 While some 
of the dissenting Justices argued that Justice Scalia did not protect the 
rights of the accused against retrial,364 this decision essentially 
expanded double jeopardy protections. 365 For example, defendant 
Dixon was convicted of contempt of court for violating his bail 
358. u.s. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
359. 509 U.s. 688, 692-93, 696 (1993). 
360. The Dixon case also overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), a case from 
which Justice Scalia dissented. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 689; Grady, 495 U.S. at 526 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
361. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and White agreed that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause barred prosecution of the criminal charges underlying the criminal contempt 
conviction. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696-700; Jd. at 730 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Jd. at 743-44 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Blackmun dissented 
from the majority as to that holding. Jd. at 714 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) ("[A]s a general matter, double jeopardy does not bar a 
subsequent prosecution based on conduct for which a defendant has been held in 
criminal contempt."); Jd. at 741 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
362. "Applying the [same-elements test], the result is clear: These crimes were different 
offenses and the subsequent prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause." 
Jd. at 701-02 (majority opinion). 
363. Id. at 697. 
364. Id. at 733-40 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
365. See id. at 691,704,707-11 (majority opinion). 
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release conditions. 366 His violation was being arrested for possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine. 367 After being convicted of the bail 
release violation, the Court held he could not be charged with the far 
more serious crime of possession with intent to distribute. 368 Dixon's 
sentence for the contempt charge was 180 days in jail. 369 Had he 
been tried and subsequently convicted of the underlying criminal 
charge, he would have faced a sentence of many years in prison. 370 
Justice Scalia emphasized the process of the contempt proceeding: 
At the show-cause hearing [for violation of terms of bail 
release], four police officers testified to facts surrounding 
the alleged drug offense; Dixon's counsel cross-examined 
these witnesses and introduced other evidence. The court 
concluded that the Government had established "'beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [Dixon] was in possession of drugs 
and that those drugs were possessed with the intent to 
distribute. '" The court therefore found Dixon guilty of 
criminal contempt[,] . . . which allows contempt sanctions 
after expedited proceedings without a jury. 371 
Justice Scalia thus demonstrated that the contempt hearing followed 
the same procedure and found the exact same facts that a jury in a 
criminal trial would have to find in order to convict Dixon of the 
criminal charge. 372 Because the government chose to proceed with 
the show-cause hearing on the contempt charge that carried a minor 
penalty, it had to forgo any further prosecution of the defendant for 
the more serious crimes with the same elements that would have 
resulted in a much harsher penalty. 373 
Justice Rehnquist dissented and articulated the pro-prosecution 
viewpoint that Justice Scalia's decision rejected the rule that "double 
jeopardy does not bar a subsequent prosecution based on conduct for 
which a defendant has been held in criminal contempt. . .. [because] 
contempt of court has different elements than the substantive criminal 
charges in this case[,] ... they are separate offenses.,,374 While 
366. Id. at 691-92. 
367. Id. at 69l. 
368. Id. at 691-92. 
369. Id. at 692 (citing D.C. CODE § 23-1329(c) (1989)). 
370. Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing D.C. CODE § 33-541(a)(2)(A) (1989)). 
371. Id. at 691-92 (majority opinion) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
372. See id. at 698-700. 
373. Id. at 698,700; see also id. at 718 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
374. Id. at 714 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
740 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
Justice Scalia's holding does not prevent another trial after every 
criminal contempt hearing,375 it has a positive impact on the rights of 
criminal defendants because bail violation hearings, which occur 
frequently, often involve allegations of new criminal behavior. 376 
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants who have 
their bond revoked and a contempt sentence imposed against them 
from being tried for crimes for which they have already been 
punished. 377 
Another double jeopardy case, Smith v. Massachusetts,378 is as 
much interesting for the unusual coalition of Justices agreeing that a 
Double Jeopardy Clause violation occurred379 as it is for its positive 
impact on the rights of criminal defendants. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia held that once a trial judge acquits a defendant of one 
criminal charge during a trial on several different counts, the judge 
may not reverse that holding and reinstate the charge. 380 While the 
dissent viewed the trial judge's change of mind as correcting an error 
that did not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause,381 Justice Scalia 
demonstrated an understanding for and sympathy to the defendant's 
situation: "In all jurisdictions . . . false assurance of acquittal on one 
count may induce the defendant to present defenses to the remaining 
375. See id. at 713 (noting that the majority's decision does not prohibit subsequent 
prosecutions for some of the charges of Foster, the Dixon companion case, following 
the criminal contempt hearing). 
376. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A 
Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183, 1277, 1280-81 (2004) (discussing how some 
contempt charges may limit further prosecution of the defendant); Melissa Wdss, 
Note, Interpreting Searches of Pretrial Releases Through the Lens of the Fourth 
Amendment Special Needs Exception, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 363, 374-75 (2006) 
(discussing the rise in public concern over a connection between defendants released 
on bail and crime). 
377. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 697,700. 
378. 543 U.S. 462 (2005). 
379. Justices joining Justice Scalia in the majority: Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and 
Thomas. Justices joining Justice Ginsburg in dissent: Rehnquist, Kennedy, and 
Breyer. Id. 
380. Id. at 473. 
381. Justice Ginsburg wrote, 
[The defendant] was subjected to a single, unbroken trial 
proceeding in which he was denied no opportunity to air his 
defense before presentation of the case to the jury. I would not 
deny prosecutors in such circumstances, based on a trial judge's 
temporary error, one full and fair opportunity to present the 
State's case. 
Id. at 480 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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counts that are inadvisable-for example, a defense that entails 
admission of guilt on the acquitted count.,,382 
As Justice Scalia recognized, once the judge acquits the defendant 
on one count after the prosecution's presentation of its case, the 
defendant presents his defense relying on that acquittal as he 
formulates trial strategy regarding which witnesses to present and 
what arguments to make. 383 Justice Scalia explained that "[ t ]he 
Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee cannot be allowed to become a 
potential snare for those who reasonably rely upon it. If, after a 
facially unqualified midtrial dismissal of one count, the trial has 
proceeded to the defendant's introduction of evidence, the acquittal 
must be treated as final .... ,,384 While this decision may prevent the 
trial court from fixing its mistakes, the dissent was only concerned 
with allowing the trial court to fix mistakes to further benefit the 
prosecution. 385 Justice Scalia ensured that the defendant's rights 
were protected. He expressed no interest in fixing the prosecutor's 
mistakes386: "Requiring someone to defend against a charge of which 
he has already been acquitted is prejudice per se for purposes of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause--even when the acquittal was erroneous 
because the evidence was sufficient. ,,387 Justice Scalia recognized 
that this holding requires that even if a defendant is guilty, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents prosecution, thus favorably 
impacting the rights of criminal defendants. 
Justice Scalia had previously issued a similarly demanding defense 
of the defendant's double jeopardy rights in his dissent in Jones v. 
Thomas. 388 The majority in Jones treated the defendant's claim 
dismissively because the defendant was clearly guilty, and the 
Missouri court corrected the mistake by imposing a sentence that 
382. Id. at 472 (majority opinion). 
383. Id. at 472 n.6. 
384. Id. at 473. 
385. Id. at 473 n.7. 
386. Justice Scalia wrote, 
Moreover, a prosecutor can seek to persuade the court to correct its legal error 
before it rules, or at least before the proceedings move forward. Indeed, the 
prosecutor in this case convinced the judge to reconsider her acquittal ruling on 
the basis of legal authority he had obtained during a IS-minute recess before 
closing arguments. Had he sought a short continuance at the time of the 
acquittal motion, the matter could have been resolved satisfactorily before 
petitioner went forward with his case. 
Id. at 474-75 (citations omitted). 
387. Id. at 473 n.7. 
388. 491 U.S. 376, 389 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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seemed appropriate for the severity of the crime. 389 The majority felt 
that to find otherwise would be giving the defendant a benefit he did 
not deserve 390: "But neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor any 
other constitutional provision exists to provide unjustified 
windfalls."391 
Justice Scalia dissented and, in an unexpected manner, argued that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause does in fact exist to provide such 
windfalls: 
The Double Jeopardy Clause is and has always been, not a 
provision designed to assure reason and justice in the 
particular case, but the embodiment of technical, 
prophylactic rules that require the Government to turn 
square comers. Whenever it is applied to release a criminal 
deserving of punishment it frustrates justice in the particular 
case, but for the greater purpose of assuring repose in the 
totality of criminal prosecutions and sentences. . .. With 
technical rules, above all others, it is imperative that we 
adhere strictly to what we have stated the rules to be. A 
technical rule with equitable exceptions is no rule at all. 
Three strikes is out. The State broke the rules here, and 
must abide by the result. 392 
Once again, Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is absolute, even when the results interfere with law 
enforcement and prosecution. Justice Scalia does not hide behind an 
idealistic view of criminals or the criminal justice system. Instead, he 
confronts the reality that following the rules may result in releasing 
the guilty and asserts that such results are exactly what are intended 
by a system designed to protect the innocent. 
C. Rule of Lenity/Strict construction 
As noted in Justice Scalia's pro-prosecution cases, he often decides 
a case based on the procedures of the criminal justice system. 393 
Where the process benefits the accused, such as the rule of lenity,394 
389. Id. at 381-82 (majority opinion). 
390. Jd. at 382 n.2. 
391. Id. at 387. 
392. Jd. at 396 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
393. Kannar, supra note 4, at 1321. 
394. When a law is unclear, "we adhere to the familiar rule that 'where there is ambiguity 
in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.'" Smith v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 223, 246 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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Justice Scalia follows the rule and finds for the defendant; where the 
process does not favor either the prosecution or the defense, Justice 
Scalia's decisions will favorably impact the defendant when 
appropriate. 395 Justice Scalia does not flinch from upholding the 
rights of the defendant when he finds he must do so in order to follow 
the law. 
Justice Scalia applied the rule of lenity in United States v. Santos, 
and writing for the majority, held that the ambiguous term proceeds 
in the statute must be interpreted in favor of the defendant. 396 Justice 
Scalia defended the rule of lenity: 
This venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental 
principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a 
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or 
subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It 
also places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best 
induce Congress to speak more clearly .... 397 
In his explanation, Justice Scalia emphasized the difficulty of 
interpreting poorly drafted statutes: "When interpreting a criminal 
statute, we do not play the part of a mind reader.,,398 Thus, while 
Justice Scalia is ruling for the defendant, his larger point is that 
legislatures need to write laws that everyone can understand and 
follow. He implicitly scolded the government for suggesting that the 
Court clear up ambiguities in the law to the prosecution's benefit: 
"We interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants, not 
prosecutors." 399 
Quite often, Justice Scalia dissented from majority opinions 
precisely because the Court failed to follow the rule of lenity. For 
example, in Smith v. United States,400 Justice Scalia dissented from 
the holding that the exchange of a gun for narcotics satisfied the 
element of "use" of the firearm during and "in relation to" drug 
trafficking. 401 Justice Scalia ridiculed such an interpretation of the 
word use, because the legislature clearly intended to punish 
individuals who used a firearm as a weapon during narcotics 
395. !d. 
396. 553 u.s. 507, 514 (2008). 
397. ld. at 514. 
398. ld. at 515. 
399. ld. at 519. 
400. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
401. See id. at 241-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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offenses. 402 "It would also be reasonable and normal to say that he 
'used' [the MAC-lO] to scratch his head. When one wishes to 
describe the action of employing the instrument of a firearm for such 
unusual purposes, 'use' is assuredly a verb one could select. ,,403 
However, the legislature obviously did not mean to punish defendants 
who happened to scratch their heads with a firearm during a narcotics 
offense through imposition of this statute anymore than the 
legislature meant to punish this specific defendant who traded his 
fireann for drugs. Even if the word use in the statue was ambiguous, 
Justice Scalia would have reversed the conviction pursuant to the rule 
of lenity. 404 
Justice Scalia again applied the rule of lenity and dissented from 
the holding in Bryan v. United States. 405 The majority found that the 
defendant's conviction for willfully violating the statute was valid 
even if the defendant was not aware of the licensing requirement he 
violated. 406 Justice Scalia found that there was no evidence 
demonstrating that the defendant knew he was violating the law and 
therefore wrote that the rule of lenity should have resulted in reversal 
of the conviction. 407 Recognizing the complexity of the modern 
criminal justice system, Justice Scalia found the rule of lenity to have 
enhanced importance: "In our era of mUltiplying new federal crimes, 
there is more reason than ever to give this ancient canon of 
construction consistent application .... ,,408 
In Holloway v. United States409 and James v. United States, 4\0 
Justice Scalia applied the rule of lenity and argued that the defendants 
should not have been convicted in either case.411 In Holloway, Justice 
Scalia expressed the pro-defense viewpoint when he dissented from a 
decision written by Justice Stevens, who wrote from the pro-
prosecution perspective.412 Holloway held that the intent requirement 
(to seriously harm or kill the driver) of a carjacking statute is satisfied 
by evidence of the defendant's conditional intent to harm the driver if 
402. ld. at 246. 
403. ld. at 242-43. 
404. See id. at 244-46. 
405. 524 U.S. 184,205 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
406. ld. at 199 n.33 (majority opinion). 
407. ld. at 202-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
408. ld. at 205. 
409. 526 U.S. I (1999). 
410. 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
411. ld. at 219 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Holloway, 526 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
412. See 526 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 12 (majority opinion) 
(rejecting Justice Scalia's application of the rule oflenity in favor of the defendant). 
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necessary to steal the car.4l3 Justice Scalia argued that when the 
statute requires that the defendant act "with the intent to cause death 
or serious bodily harm," conditional intent does not satisfy this mens 
rea. 414 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for misinterpreting the 
law simply to punish the defendant's behavior, despite the fact that 
the defendant lacked the necessary intent. 415 
Justice Scalia emphasized that defendant Holloway specifically did 
not want to seriously harm or kill the driver because Holloway 
wanted the driver to give up the car upon demand.416 His mens rea 
was the opposite of the intent necessary for conviction under the 
statute, and Justice Scalia objected to the Court's consideration of 
conditional intent: "It is difficult enough to determine a defendant's 
actual intent; it is infinitely more difficult to determine what the 
defendant planned to do upon the happening of an event that the 
defendant hoped would not happen . . . .,,417 Justice Scalia invoked 
the rule of lenity as an alternative and stated that "[if] the statue is 
not, as I think, clear in the defendant's favor, it is at the very least 
ambiguous and the defendant must be given the benefit of the 
doubt.,,418 
The majority in James held that the Florida conviction of attempted 
burglary satisfied the violent-felony element in a federal statute. 419 
Justice Scalia dissented and argued that attempted burglary does not 
satisfy the element because otherwise it is impossible to know 
whether one is in violation of the law420: "The rule of lenity, 
grounded in part on the need to give "'fair warning'" of what is 
encompassed by a criminal statute demands that we give this text the 
more narrow reading of which it is susceptible.,,421 Justice Scalia 
focused on ensuring that the law clearly indicated what is prohibited, 
not on ensuring that criminal defendants are convicted. 422 
Justice Scalia applied the rule of scienter in his dissent from the 
child pornography case of United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 423 
The majority held that the term knowingly applied to the elements of 
413. ld. at 12. 
414. ld. at 12-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. III». 
415. ld. 
416. ld. at 12. 
417. ld. at 19. 
418. ld. at 21. 
419. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007). 
420. ld. at 214, 216, 225 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
421. ld. at 219 (citation omitted). 
422. ld. at 215-16. 
423. 513 U.S. 64, 80 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the crime despite the fact that to do so made no grammatical sense. 424 
To rule otherwise would have meant that the defendant's conviction 
would have been reversed, because if Congress omitted a scienter 
requirement, then the statute violates the Constitution and is 
unenforceable. 425 Justice Scalia criticized the Court for upholding the 
conviction instead of ruling that the statute was fatally flawed: "The 
Court today saves a single conviction by putting in place a relatively 
toothless child-pornography law that Congress did not enact.,,426 
Justice Scalia's use of strict construction of statutes also benefits 
criminal defendants. In Johnson v. United States,427 Justice Scalia 
wrote that in order to determine whether a prior conviction is a 
violent felony for sentencing-enhancement purposes in federal court, 
a court must look to whether the prior conviction was considered 
violent in the jurisdiction where the defendant was convicted. 428 
Thus, although the common law considered the conviction to be 
violent, Justice Scalia found that the defendant's prior battery 
conviction under Florida law was not a violent felony. 429 Because it 
was not a violent felony, the sentence could not be enhanced under 
the federal law. 430 
Similarly, in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno,431 Justice Scalia 
dissented from the majority's ruling that the venue in a kidnapping 
and firearm conviction was properly found, even though the 
defendant did not possess a firearm in that jurisdiction. 432 Justice 
Scalia argued that the case was tried in the wrong jurisdiction and 
that the conviction could not stand: 
The short of the matter is that this defendant, who has a 
constitutional right to be tried in the State and district where 
his alleged crime was "committed," has been prosecuted for 
using a gun during a kidnapping in a State and a district 
where all agree he did not use a gun during a kidnapping. If 
to state this case is not to decide it, the law has departed 
424. Id. at 68-69, 77-78 (majority opinion). 
425. As Justice Scalia explains, the statute is unconstitutional because "by imposing 
criminal liability upon those not knowingly dealing in pornography, it establishes a 
severe deterrent, not narrowly tailored to its purposes, upon fully protected First 
Amendment activities." Id. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
426. Id. at 87. 
427. 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010). 
428. Id. at 1269-70. 
429. Id. at 1271-72, 1274. 
430. Id. at 1268-74. 
43l. 526 U.S. 275 (1999). 
432. Id. at 282-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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further from the meaning of language than is appropriate for 
a government that is supposed to rule (and to be restrained) 
through the written word. 433 
747 
Justice Scalia once again defended the right of the criminal defendant 
to be convicted only for the crime he has actually committed. He 
strenuously objected to the Court's distortion of the facts in order to 
uphold this conviction. 
In United States v. Resendiz-Ponce,434 Justice Scalia dissented from 
the majority's holding that an indictment alleging attempted illegal 
reentry into the country did not need to specifically allege an overt 
act. 435 Justice Scalia argued that the defect constituted reversible 
error because "the Government was required to state not only that 
Resendiz-Ponce 'knowingly and intentionally attempted to enter the 
United States of America,' but also that he 'took a substantial step' 
toward that end.,,436 An indictment that does not allege the elements 
of the offense should not stand. 437 
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented from a case that punished 
behavior that was not a crime at the time of the act. In Rogers v. 
Tennessee, 438 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a defendant 
by allowing the Tennessee court to retroactively abolish the common 
law "year and a day rule.,,439 Justice Scalia vigorously dissented and 
argued that the majority violated the Ex Post Facto Clause440: "To 
begin with, let us be clear that the law here was altered after the fact. 
Petitioner ... was innocent of murder under the law as it stood at the 
time of the stabbing, because the victim did not die until after a year 
and a day had passed.,,441 Justice Scalia reviewed the history of the 
Due Process Clause and the prohibition against ex post facto laws 
and further emphasized that the goal of those provisions is to give 
notice (or fair warning) of what is against the law.442 Justice Scalia 
433. Id. at 285 (citations omitted). 
434. 549 U.S. 102 (2007). 
435. Id. at 117 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 107 (majority opinion). 
436. Id. at 116 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
437. See id. at 108 (majority opinion). 
438. 532 U.S. 451 (2001). 
439. Id. at 453. "At common law, the year and a day rule provided that no defendant could 
be convicted of murder unless his victim had died by the defendant's act within a year 
and a day of that act." Id. 
440. Id. at 467-71, 478 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
441. Id. at 468. 
442. Id. at 470. 
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objected to the unfairness of retroactively changing the law to apply 
against this defendant. 
D. Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affIrmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 443 
Justice Scalia wrote several Fourth Amendment decisions that 
favorably impact the rights of criminal defendants in the context of 
home searches. In Arizona v. Hicks,444 Justice Scalia wrote for the 
majority and found that a police officer violated the "plain view" 
exception to the Warrant Clause when he moved stereo equipment to 
find and record its serial number. 445 Although the officer was 
lawfully on the premises of the home in response to exigent 
circumstances, the Court held that the offIcer needed probable cause 
in order to search the equipment without a warrant. 446 Even though 
the equipment itself was plainly visible to the officers, there was 
nothing incriminating about the equipment. 447 The offIcer could not 
seize the equipment until he searched it for the serial number 
information and then investigated with that number to determine that 
the equipment had been stolen. 448 
Justice Scalia's decision rejected the suggestion that such a search 
was merely a cursory inspection that is justifiable under a reasonable 
suspicion standard. 449 He further expressed no concern about any 
negative impact on police investigation: "It may well be that, in such 
circumstances, no effective means short of a search exist. But there 
is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes 
insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us 
all.,,450 
443. u.s. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
444. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
445. Id. at 325. 
446. Id. at 326-27. 
447. Id. at 324 (explaining that the stereo had to be moved to find the incriminating 
numbers, which was outside the exigency). 
448. Id. at 323. 
449. Id. at 328-29. 
450. Id. at 329. 
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In Kyllo v. United States, 451 Justice Scalia again protected the 
sanctity of the home against governmental intrusion. Police aimed a 
thermal imaging device at defendant Kyllo's home, which indicated 
that parts of the home were relatively hotter than other parts of the 
home.452 Using the information gained from the thermal imaging 
device, the police obtained and executed a search warrant and 
discovered more than 100 marijuana plants being grown inside 
Kyllo's house. 453 
The Court held that the scanning of the home with the thermal 
imaging device was a search under the Fourth Amendment and thus 
the police should have obtained a warrant prior to the scan. 454 Justice 
Scalia wrote that '''[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment 
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be 
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. ",455 The Court was 
challenged with applying the constitutional rules from a previous era 
to new technology that enables the user to view inside a home. In the 
holding, Justice Scalia explained that a search using a device that sees 
inside a house and is not in general public-use requires a warrant. 456 
This result is dictated by the fact that the "Fourth Amendment draws 
a firm line at the entrance to the house. That line ... must be not only 
firm but also bright-which requires clear specification of those 
methods of surveillance that require a warrant. ,,457 
N. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is too simplistic to note that the impact of Justice 
Scalia's decisions may be more positive for criminal defendants 
precisely because the Constitution itself favors the rights of criminal 
defendants against the power of the government. The drafters of the 
Constitution feared an oppressive, powerful government that would 
strip away the rights of the people. 458 Thus, a Justice who subscribes 
to originalism is a Justice whose decisions must positively impact 
criminal defendants in the area of constitutional criminal procedure. 
Specifically, Justice Scalia wants the criminal defendant to have 
what the Constitution gives him-but no more. He objects when the 
45l. 533 u.s. 27 (2001). 
452. Id. at 30. 
453. Id. at 29-30. 
454. Id. at 40. 
455. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
456. !d. at 40. 
457. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
458. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text. 
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Court tries to write new procedures or new protections into the 
Constitution. However in many areas, such as his decisions 
concerning the rule of lenity and strict construction, Justice Scalia 
takes the defendant's point of view and argues vigorously for the 
rights of the defendant against the power of the government. 459 
Justice Scalia acknowledges that his approach to constitutional 
jurisprudence may limit the power of the prosecution to convict, but 
he neither denies such a result nor does he twist the rule of law to . 
protect government power. He does not allow a favorable result for a 
criminal defendant to influence his understanding of the law and thus 
applies the law fairly. Characteristic of his approach, he recognizes 
that sometimes witnesses do not appear for trial, thereby destroying 
the government's ability to prosecute: "When this occurs, the 
Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a windfall. We may not, 
however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect 
of allowing the guilty to go free.,,460 
459. See supra Part III.C. 
460. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
